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Introduction: The American Health Care System 
The narrative of American exceptionalism dates back to the earliest periods of American 
history, with America viewed as a mythical “city on a hill,” and continues to be a mainstay in 
American political discourse.1 Social scientists typically reject the nationalist or normative 
implications of such views; nevertheless,  they have debated the extent to which the development 
of the United States differs from that of other nations, and the exceptional nature of those 
national differences.2 No consensus on the general question of the United States as a distinctive 
nation has been reached, but there is agreement regarding particular topics.  
Of the various differences between the policy approaches of the United States and other 
high-income countries, few are more exceptional than the health insurance system in the United 
States. Even critics of the exceptionalism thesis admit that the health insurance system of the 
United States contrasts sharply with those of other countries.3 This senior project is an 
examination of why provision for health insurance in the US has diverged from that of other 
nations. First, however, it is necessary to explain how health insurance differs in the United 
States as opposed to other countries.  
                                                                
1 John Torpey, “American Exceptionalism?” in The New Blackwell Companion to the Sociology Religion, 
ed. Bryan S. Turner, 141–59. (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010),141.  
2 Robin Archer, Why Is There No Labor Party in the United States, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2007). 
Eric Foner, “Why Is There No Socialism in the United States.” History Workshop 17 (1984): 57–80. 
Michael Kammen, “The Problem of American Exceptionalism: A Reconsideration.” American Quarterly 
45, no. 1 (1993): 1–43. 
Seymour Martin Lipset, and Gary Marks. It Didn’t Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed in the United 
States, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000_. 
Byron E Shafer, “American Exceptionalism.” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999): 445–63. 
Werner Sombart. Why Is There No Socialism in the United States? trans. Patricia M. Hocking and C.T. 
Husbands, (White Plains, NY: International Arts and Science Press, 1976). 
3 Graham K. Wilson, Only in America? The Politics of the United States in Comparative Perspective, 
(Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1998), 73-75.  
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A common misconception holds that whereas the United States has a purely market based 
health insurance system, other high-income countries have a government run single payer 
system. This is simply incorrect, for two reasons. One, it understates the role of government in 
the provision of health insurance in the United States, and secondly, it overstates the role of 
government in the provision of health insurance in other countries.  
 Health insurance in the United States is mostly a private phenomenon, with most insured 
US citizens receiving that coverage through a private, usually for-profit, insurance company.4 
Typically, this is done through the workplace, with the employer providing group plans to all 
full-time employees. Employers of a certain size are required to offer health insurance, and 
receive tax benefits for doing so.5 Although there are minimum requirements plans have to meet, 
they vary heavily in quality and coverage.6 They are not always comprehensive, as insured 
people frequently have to pay an amount known as a co-pay to access services. The plans are 
usually not free, and can charge monthly deductibles. Dependents can often be placed in the 
same plan as an employee, usually at extra cost. For Americans whose employer does not offer 
insurance, the other private option is to buy insurance on the market, which uninsured people are 
now required to do as a result of the Affordable Care Act, with failure to do so resulting in a fine. 
For those with medium-low incomes, the government provides a subsidy to purchase insurance.7 
                                                                
4 Jessica C. Barnett, and Marina S. Vornovitsky. “Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2015.” 
Washington D.C., 2016, 2.  
5 Most employee contributions to employer-sponsored insurance are also deductible, although not all are, 
depending on the type of plan. Employer contributions are not subject to the payroll tax, making them 
more cost effective for the employer and employee than providing the same funds in the form of wages. 
Jonathan Gruber, “The Tax Exclusion for Employer Sponsored Health Insurance,” Working Paper 15766 
(National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010), 3-5, 19.  
Sara Rosenbaum, “The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Implications for Public Health Policy 
and Practice,” Public Health Reports 126, no. 1 (2011): 130.  
6 Ibid., 131.  
7 Ibid.  
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Care itself is provided at private institutions, often the office of practitioners or at privately 
owned hospitals. This is roughly how private insurance works in the United States, a facially 
private system with substantial support from the government.  
An increasing number of American do not receive their health insurance privately. About  
40% now receive health insurance through the government, a number which has grown since the 
passage of the Affordable Care Act.8 The two largest government health insurance programs are 
Medicare, a program for the elderly, and Medicaid, a program for the poor. Medicare provides 
hospital insurance to Americans over age 65, with the option of buying supplemental physicians’ 
insurance.9 Medicare is a national program, without state involvement. Medicaid, by contrast, is 
a federally funded program in which requirements and the basic operations are set by the state 
governments, leading to large state-level differences.10 Although Medicare and Medicaid were 
created simultaneously, the two have different political fortunes, with Medicare polling far more 
favorably.11 Medicare is paid for by the payroll tax, which also covers Social Security, and the 
popular conception is that an individual worker puts money into the Medicare pool which they 
then deservedly use in retirement. Medicaid, by contrast, is paid through general funds. 
A substantial number of Americans, 13.2%, have no health insurance at all.12 This 
number has decreased recently due to the policies of the Affordable Care Act, particularly 
Medicaid expansion, the individual mandate, and subsidies for private insurance. Still, the 
                                                                
8 Barnett and Vornovitsky, “Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2015,” 2.  
9 Beatrix Hoffman, Health Care for Some: Rights and Rationing in the United States Since 1930, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 123-124. 
10  Barnett and Vornovitsky, “Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2015,” 14.  
11 Martin Gilens, Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media and the Politics of Antipoverty Policy, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 44-45.  
12 Barnett and Vornovitsky. “Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2015,” 4.  
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passage of the Affordable Care Act has not eliminated the problem of uninsurance, Only further 
legislation would be able to eliminate the uninsured population.  
How does this system compare to that of other countries? It depends which countries one 
is comparing to. Generally, the most distinctive element of the US health insurance system is the 
large number of uninsured people. The United States has the highest rate of uninsured people of 
any OECD country, with the exception of crisis-ridden Greece.13 Unlike Greece, the high rate of 
uninsurance is not the result of factors temporally specific to the current era, but is instead the 
result of the wider historical development of the health insurance system. The second major 
distinction is that the US tends to have a larger role for for-profit insurance companies than do 
other countries. It is important, however, not to exaggerate this distinction. The problem is that 
other countries’ health insurance systems vary widely. The British system, for example, does not 
have a major role for for-profit insurers. Instead, the national government provides not only 
health insurance but a government run national health service which directly provides care to 
patients. The only comparable component of the US system is the Veterans’ Administration 
hospital network. In France, by contrast, government provided insurance covers most major 
illnesses, but there are gaps in the public insurance which are filled by private companies.14 
Japan has a mostly for-profit system.15 Germany’s sickness-funds are private, but are highly 
regulated and are not for profit.16 These differences matter in understanding what is and is not 
distinctive about health insurance in the United States.  
                                                                
13 OECD, “Health at a Glance 2015,” (Paris, 2016), 121.  
14 Victor G. Rodwin “The Health Care System Under French National Health Insurance: Lessons for 
Health Reform in the United States,” American Journal of Public Health 93, no. 1 (2003), 31-32.  
15 Thomas Bodenheimer, and Kevin Grumbach. “Health Care in Four Nations.” in The Social Medicine 
Reader: Health Policy, Markets, and Medicine, ed, Jonathan Oberlander et. al, (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2005), 218-225. 
16 Ibid., 200-205.  
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Before beginning a discussion of the history of health policy in the United States, it is 
necessary to define and distinguish several key terms which are commonly used in health 
insurance debates. “Universal health insurance” is a system in which everyone has insurance, but 
this insurance could be provided any number of ways, from the use of for-profit companies to 
government insurance. A single payer system, by contrast, combines universal coverage with the 
presence of a “single payer”, the government. Thus, one can have a universal health insurance 
system without a single payer system. National health insurance is single payer done at the 
national level. This is important when making regional distinctions, as other countries’ provinces 
have sometimes passed their own single payer system prior to there being national health 
insurance.17 During the 1930’s and 40’s, debates centered around the use of the terms 
“voluntary” and “compulsory” insurance. These terms have changed meanings over time, as 
“voluntary” insurance in that context referred to private insurance, and “compulsory” insurance 
referred to public insurance. The concept that private insurance might be compulsory, as is the 
case under the Affordable Care Act, had not yet been formulated. Finally, “socialized medicine” 
is a term frequently used in a derogatory manner, and without clear meaning. The constantly 
changing usage leaves it without analytic precision, and the term is not used in this paper.  
There are several methods of paying for medical care. “Fee for service” was the 
traditional method of paying for medical service, in which a patient pays an individual physician 
for each service performed, with the fee decided entirely by the individual doctor, usually on a 
sliding scale.  This contrasts with other methods. Insurance can be provided on an indemnity, 
service benefits, or pre-paid model. With indemnity payments, the patient provides payment and 
then bills the insurer for reimbursement, while with a service benefits model the provider bills 
                                                                
17 Antonia Maioni, Parting at the Crossroads, The Emergence of Health Insurance in the United States 
and Canada, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 93.   
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the insurer directly.18 Alternatively, in a pre-paid model, physicians receive either a salary or 
receive automatic payments based on the number of patients they see, without the need to bill for 
a given service.19 Service benefits plan are the most common type of insurance, although pre-
paid plans have risen in usage in recent years through Health Maintenance Organizations 
(HMOs). Indemnity, service benefits, and pre-paid care are consistent with either public or 
private insurance. Medicare, for example, uses a service benefits model, whereas the Veterans 
Administration system is pre-paid.  
A Brief History Health Policy in the United States  
 Federal government action on health insurance began in the 18th century, with a 1798 act 
guaranteeing health insurance for sailors.20 Despite this early government intervention, health 
insurance was not a major issue during the late 18th and 19th centuries. Individuals saw a family 
doctor who accepted a fee from the patient. Doctors would use a sliding scale to allow 
individuals with lesser means to be able to afford care. Quality of care was poor, however, and as 
one analyst put it, at the turn of the 20th century a random physician seeing a random patient with 
a random disease would only have a fifty percent chance of actually helping the patient.21 
 Changes in the structure of medicine during the late 19th and early 20th century brought 
about major change in the delivery of medical care. Hospitals were becoming increasingly 
central to the delivery of medical care.22 This, along with the Flexner Report, which called for 
increased standards in medical schools, caused an increase in the cost of health care.23 A small 
                                                                
18 Hoffman, Health Care for Some, 92.  
19 Ibid., 191. 
20 Ibid., xxvi.  
21 Julius B. Richmond and Rashi Fein, The Health Care Mess: How We Got Into It and What It Will Take 
To Get Out, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 9.  
22 Paul Starr, The Social Transformation in American Medicine, (New York: Basic Books, 1982), 146.  
23 David Dranove, Code Red: An Economist Explains How to Revive the Healthcare System Without 
Destroying it, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 9. 
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number of people received medical care through their employers, but these occupations were few 
and far between.24 Most people paid the physician for the service received, with additional 
procedures costing additional money.  
 Other countries were beginning to experiment heavily with health insurance, including 
Germany and the United Kingdom. In the United States, the American Association for Labor 
Legislation, a group led mostly by college professors, tried to enact compulsory insurance in the 
1910’s, but the effort failed.25 The national American Federation of Labor, led by Samuel 
Gompers, refused to support the legislation for ideological reasons, due to his belief that working 
people should not rely on government benefits for their well-being, but rather through private 
action.26 The AALL’s proposals were not limited to health insurance. They included sick pay 
insurance, a higher priority for many workers than health insurance, as well as life insurance, the 
latter of which upset the powerful life insurance industry, contributing to the downfall of the 
proposal.27 This moment of potential reformed ended with the United States’ entry into World 
War 1, as the AALL’s link to German policies were no longer politically tenable.28 In a reversal 
of future health insurance battles, the American Medical Association was ambivalent about these 
proposals, at times even supportive. By 1920, however, the AMA had decided it was opposed to 
compulsory health insurance, as the AMA was concerned about the loss of autonomy that would 
result from state intervention, and the disruption of the fee for service system with a potential 
                                                                
24 In 1928, 11% of firms with fewer than 250 workers, and 15.5% of firms with 150 or more workers, 
provided health or accident insurance.  Frank Dobbin, “The Origins of Private Social Insurance: Public 
Policy and Fringe Benefits in America, 1920-1950,” American Journal of Sociology 97, no.5 (1992): 
1424.  
25 Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers:The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United 
States, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 176-204. 
26 Ibid., 207-210.  
27 Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine, 252.  
28 Ibid., 253.  
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reduction of income.29 From that point on, the AMA has been opposed to universal health 
insurance efforts, often constituting the chief resistance to such proposals.  
 Proponents of universal health insurance were less active in the 1920s, but the 20s 
nonetheless contained several major developments. The first of these is the 1921 Sheppard-
Towner Act, which subsidized clinics pre and post birth care for mothers and newly born infants, 
creating a potential precedent for government intervention in health care.30 The Act expired in 
1929 without renewal.31 Second was the creation of the Committee on the Costs of Medical 
Care, founded in 1927, which conducted research on efforts to solve the growing problem of 
unaffordable medical care. Its report was released in 1932, and found that hospitalization costs 
were well beyond the means of the average family, with patients relying on hospital to provide 
care for free. It criticized fee for service as creating misplaced incentives in which physicians 
financially benefit from providing unnecessary treatments.32 Thirdly, new alternatives to 
traditional fee for service care were developed, the first of these being the development of Blue 
Cross hospital insurance in 1929 at Baylor University Hospital.33  The medical field was 
undergoing major changes, trying to find ways to allow people to access the newer, more costly 
care. It had not yet found a way to do this sustainably when the Great Depression hit, 
exacerbating the already existing problems.  
It is in this context that the Roosevelt administration attempted to provide a universal or 
near-universal solution to the problem by creating a system of public insurance. Government was 
not the only actor looking at solutions, however. Private, voluntary insurance grew in usage in 
                                                                
29 Ibid., 247-248. 
Hoffman, Health Care for Some, xxxiv.  
30 Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers, 10.  
31 Ibid., 514.  
32 Dranove, Code Red,11-14.  
33 Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine, 295-298.  
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this time, but the growth was mostly limited to hospital insurance. The American Medical 
Association opposed insurance, public or private, that included medical care, if it did not follow 
a strict set of conditions. For example, the AMA required that “the immediate cost should be 
borne by the patient if able to pay at the time the service is rendered.”34 This hardline position 
began to soften in the late 1930’s, partially in response to efforts by proponents of public 
insurance. The AMA began, with much internal tension, to support Blue Shield physicians’ 
insurance, although enrollment was highly limited at first.35 Despite the limitations on these 
private insurance efforts, they suggested to opponents of national health insurance that the 
private sector might be able to provide insurance for the vast majority of Americans, even though 
this was not yet the case. By 1940, less than 10% of Americans had hospital insurance, with 
fewer possessing surgical benefits. Health costs continued to rise, however, despite many 
Americans’ inability to pay. In 1929, health spending was 3.5% of GDP. In 1940, it was 4.0%. 
Ten years later, it was 4.4%, and by 1960, health spending was equal to 5.3% of GDP.36  
Access to health insurance rose precipitously during the Second World War. There is 
some argument as to what factors were most crucial to this rise. The traditional argument is that 
during World War 2, the government imposed strict limits on wage increases which did not 
apply to fringe benefits. Employers thus added benefits, including health insurance, in lieu of pay 
increases.37 More recent analyses have questioned this causal linkage, arguing that the 1939 
revisions to the Social Security Act incentivized employer provision of fringe benefits, leading to 
                                                                
34 The AMA explicitly opposed hospital insurance that included medical care, in contrast to the costs of 
hospitalization. Quoted in Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine, 299-300.  
35 Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine, 306-310.  
36 Dranove, Code Red, 12.  
37 Frank Dobbin, “The Origins of Private Social Insurance: Public Policy and Fringe Benefits in America, 
1920-1950,” 1436-1437. 
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the increase in pension coverage as well as health insurance coverage during the war.38 The 
increase in insurance did not stop at the end of the war. Labor unions, which supported a national 
health insurance system took on an increasing role in negotiating private insurance plans.39 By 
1950, when key supporters of national health insurance lost re-election, 50.7% of Americans had 
hospital insurance, with 35.8% having surgical benefits, rates which continued to increase up to 
the creation of Medicare and Medicaid. Figure 1 graphs the increase of insurance rates 
throughout this period, although there is no solid data from before 1940.  
 
Figure 1. Percentage of Americans covered by health insurance.  
Source: Louis Reed, “Private Health Insurance: Coverage and Financial Experience, 1940-
1966,” Social Security Bulletin 30, no. 11 (1967): 12. 
 
This strong role for private insurance has created strong path dependency effects, by 
reducing popular demand for universal public insurance. Despite the myriad complaints with 
private health insurance, a citizen covered by private insurance would be significantly less likely 
to push for government insurance than if they were uninsured entirely. By the early 1950’s, there 
                                                                
38 Ibid., 1438-1440. 
39 Alan Derickson, “Health Security for All? Social Unionism and Universal Health Insurance, 1935-
1958,” The Journal  of American History 60, no. 4  (1994): 1346-1350. 
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were several groups which were disproportionally uninsured, including African-Americans, the 
elderly, the poor, farmers, and workers at small businesses, all groups which lacked substantial 
political power.40 Reformers such as Oscar Ewing soon focused on covering  some of these gaps 
with targeted programs, a vision which was later realized with Medicare and Medicaid.41 
Medicare and Medicaid were passed with strong backing by organized labor and lukewarm 
reaction by hospitals, over the opposition of a declining AMA.42  
After 1950, a national, single-payer health care system has been almost entirely off the 
political agenda. It has received support from some members of Congress, from Ted Kennedy to 
Bernie Sanders, but it has not received the support of any sitting president since Truman, and has 
not made legislative headway. The development of high levels of private insurance, along with 
the role played by Medicare and Medicaid, has made the later passage national health insurance 
far less likely. 
To answer the question of why the United States lacks national health insurance, it is 
therefore necessary to examine a period prior to these strong path dependency effects, as in many 
ways the results of the earlier health insurance debates determined the results of later ones. This 
senior project examines the broader question of why the US lacks universal health insurance 
through an investigation into two critical moments: the presidencies of Roosevelt and Truman. 
The battles over health insurance policy during both presidents have been heavily written about 
by historians and social scientists. This project attempts to evaluate and synthesize the available 
studies, and it also provides additional insight into this historical moment through the use of 
original archival research. The primary sources consulted form the basis for the narratives 
                                                                
40 Hoffman, Health Care for Some, 90-91.  
41 Maioni, Parting at the Crossroads, 108-110.  
42 Colin Gordon, Dead on Arrival: The Politics of Health Care in Twentieth-Century America, (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 234-242. 
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developed in chapters 2 and 3. Documents were consulted from the archives of the 
Interdepartmental Committee to Coordinate Health and Welfare Activities at the Roosevelt 
Presidential Library, the archives of Senator Robert Wagner, housed at Georgetown University, 
the records of Frances Perkins, held at Columbia University, and the records of the Committee 
for the Nation’s Health, held at the New York Academy of Medicine.   
Chapter 1 provides a general overview and evaluation of the major explanations that have 
been offered for the exceptional health insurance system of the United States. I find that some of 
these deserve more careful consideration than others. Chapters 2 and 3 consider the stronger 
explanations in more detail within the context of struggles for universal health insurance during 
the Roosevelt and Truman presidencies, respectively.    
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Chapter 1: Explaining the American Health Insurance Dilemma   
Previous researchers have formulated several explanations for the unique character of the 
US health insurance system. These explanations are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and 
should instead be seen as adding to each other. It is important to note that some explanations are 
temporally specific; the reasons why President Truman’s health insurance push failed are not 
necessarily the reasons why President Clinton’s proposal made little headway in Congress. This 
temporal specificity does not mean we can look at any given policy battle over health insurance 
completely separately from previous fights. Each major debate on health insurance policy has 
left a policy legacy with lasting implications. Just as the failure to pass national health insurance 
under Truman shaped the goals of later reformers, the Democrats under President Obama learned 
from the mistakes made under President Clinton to successfully pass the Affordable Care Act. 
Thus, some explanations may only be relevant to a particular moment, whereas others are used 
across eras. The goal of this chapter is to describe these cross-temporal explanations, and to 
evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of them.  
The Industrialism Approach 
 Early theorists of the welfare state viewed it as an inevitable consequence of economic 
growth and industrialization. These changes created the need and capacity for a welfare state.1 
This approach has fallen out of favor compared to other models. It is particularly ill-suited to 
explain the United States’ distinctive health insurance system, given the high levels of 
industrialization in the United States. There is little question that the United States’ possesses the 
technical and economic capacity to have national health insurance. Yet, as Hacker argues, this 
does not mean that the industrialism approach lacks any validity in explaining interstate variance 
                                                                
1 Harold L. Wilensky and Charles N. Lebeaux, Industrial Society and Social Welfare (New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation, 1958), 14-15.  
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in health policy, for “national health policies are indeed constrained by economic conditions and 
by the underlying features of the medical sector.”2 The industrialism approach may be 
particularly useful for understanding why health insurance policy became salient, first in the 
1910s to a limited extent, and then more so in the 1930s and 1940s. As health technology, 
quality, and thus cost increased, the provision of health care became increasingly consequential 
as a political issue.  
The Liberal Tradition 
 One argument for the distinctiveness of the United States in policy and ideology is the 
strength and character of its liberal tradition. The United States is said by theorists in this 
tradition to have a particularly laissez-faire political ideology, a consequence of the lack of an 
American feudal tradition.3 Statist challengers to laissez-faire doctrine in the United States have 
more difficulty gaining traction than they do in Europe. This results in less class consciousness, 
as well as less popular and elite support for government programs.4 The ultimate effect of this is 
a generally smaller welfare state, and specifically less government involvement in health 
insurance.  
 This emphasis on national values is more common in the older literature, with the clearest 
example being Daniel Hirshfield’s book on The Lost Reform. For Hirshfield, proponents of 
public health insurance continuously had difficulty gaining substantial support for their 
proposals. Although by the time of the New Deal there was support for government action in a 
range of matters, not just health care, that action “had to conform as much as possible to the 
                                                                
2 Jacob Hacker, “The Historical Logic of National Health Insurance: Structure and Sequence in the 
Development of British, Canadian, and U.S. Medical Policy,” Studies in American Political Development 
12, no. 1 (1998): 62. 
3 Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1955), 3-5. 
4 Ibid., 261-264.  
15 
  
traditional views of individualism, freedom, and responsibility.”5 If there was a less intrusive 
proposal with less government involvement, the proposals for state intervention would receive 
less support.6 This, Hirshfield argues, was the path taken by health insurance proposals in the 
New Deal, with private insurance winning out over government plans because it was more 
ideologically consistent with Americans’ views. 
 The liberalism approach, with its focus on culture and ideology, is initially plausible. 
Public opinion surveys taken in recent decades show that Americans are less supportive of 
government action to secure a basic income, reduce income inequality, take care of poor people, 
provide food and shelter for those in need, and provide health insurance.7 Distinctive social 
conditions in the United States could plausibly lead to a distinctive set of values, which, while 
changing over time, led to reduced support for a European-style welfare state. Ultimately, 
however, national values are not able to explain the distinctive path taken by the United States 
with regards to health policy. Given the weaknesses in this approach, it is dealt with in detail in 
this literature review rather than in the following two chapters.  
 There are several problems with this approach. First, it takes American ideology as a 
constant, as opposed to something which changes with social conditions. Liberal ideology 
changed over time, such that by the New Deal there was substantial support for the Social 
Security pension system.8 The exclusion of health insurance from Social Security cannot be 
                                                                
5 Daniel Hirshfield, The Lost Reform, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 43.  
6 Ibid.  
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chalked up to an ideology ahistorically conceived, but must be explained with reference to the 
actual historic conditions and the dominant ideology of the time. The path of Social Security, 
along with other New Deal proposals, does not conform to Hirshfield’s generalization that 
government action took the least intrusive approach possible.  It would have been plausible for 
employers to have expanded private pensions enough that there was no need for a near-universal 
government pension plan. That this did not take place shows that non-minimally intrusive 
policies were able to be passed in the 1930’s, and that Hirshfield’s claim regarding the 
relationship between liberal ideology and policy outcomes is incorrect. Liberalism in the United 
States has changed over time, and has at times allowed intensive government interventions not 
obviously consistent with individualism.  
 If ideological consensus in the United States changes over time, it is necessary to explain 
that change. This moves away from the strongest form of the liberalism hypothesis, which wants 
to locate laissez-faire beliefs at the core of American political thought rather than as arising out 
of particular temporal circumstances which sometimes dissipate. One might reasonably argue 
that contemporary Americans’ relatively weak support for government involvement in certain 
economic issues is the result of longstanding trends in American history, but it may well also 
reflect the product or more temporally specific events, as public opinion is not stagnant. 
Americans in the 1990’s had attitudes towards the welfare state more similar to European 
attitudes than they did in the 1980’s.9 We should not overstate the argument; the proponents of 
the liberalism approach are aware that political beliefs are not stagnant. However, the temporal 
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instability of public opinion suggests that the dominance of laissez-faire liberalism at a particular 
moment is not the result of some intrinsic characteristic of American society.  
 A second major problem with the national values argument is that it takes for granted that 
the American social state is smaller than in comparable European countries. This has not always 
been the case. The United States developed a universal public education system earlier than in 
many comparable countries, contrary to the expectations of the liberal values approach.10 
Additionally, the United States developed a large pension system in the aftermath of the Civil 
War to cover war veterans, prior to many European states creating their own pension systems. 
The program ended up covering about a third of Northern men of the appropriate age.11 Again, 
the liberal values approach would predict the American welfare state to lag behind in all realms, 
not just in healthcare or income support, a prediction not supported by the historical evidence.  
Third, the national values approach lacks a clear mechanism by which national values do 
or do not result in certain forms of state action. The national values approach assumes that elite 
and popular attitudes are in sync with each other, using elite writings to make assumptions about 
the views of ordinary Americans, and then assumes that those values are enacted in public 
policy. From conflict over labor organizing to the debates over health insurance, there has been 
no such clear ideological consensus in favor of classical liberalism in US history. Different 
organizations and individuals have made competing arguments, with some resulting in changes 
in government policy, and others failing to do so. The national values approach does not explain 
the relationship between these differing ideas and policy outcomes.  
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A more nuanced version of the national values argument is that national values are 
reflected in public opinion, and that public opinion then shapes public policy. This second claim 
is a debated topic in the literature. Quadagno and Street, critics of the liberal values argument, 
find that “changes in U.S. government policy from the 1950s to the 1980s [had] little 
correspondence between public sentiment for more versus less government and the decisions 
made by politicians”.12 More contemporary evidence suggests that government is responsive to 
public opinion generally, although once income is controlled for only the views of high-income 
individuals impact policy.13 Even if we accept the claim that public opinion has a strong impact 
on government action, this is still an insufficiently supported argument to explain why the United 
States’ health system is distinct. To apply the liberal values argument with regards to public 
opinion would misrepresent public opinion on government health insurance. The public’s answer 
to questions about health insurance are quite sensitive to the wording of the question, but overall 
the public has not been strongly opposed to government health insurance.14 This was particularly 
not the case in the 1930’s and 1940’s, prior to the AMA’s campaign to delegitimize the Truman 
plan.  
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 In 1938, a large majority (81%) of Americans thought that the “government should be 
responsible for providing medical care for people who are unable to pay for it”.15 This is not the 
same as universal health insurance, as it instead proposes a means-tested program. It nonetheless 
shows support for the basic principle that everyone should have access to care, with at least some 
government involvement. The first poll asking about a universal plan was issued in 1943, which 
showed 59% of the public in favor of expanding Social Security to include health insurance, 
hospital bills, doctors’ bills, and sickness pay.16 58% supported doing so in a poll taken the 
following year, with an additional 10% willing to support such a plan if taxes were not raised.17  
After the war, several pollsters asked more open-ended questions about what they would 
like to see happen with the insurance system. These data suggest a public more cautious about 
government health insurance than was the case during the war, which could be reflective of 
sensitivity to the wording or to actual changes in beliefs. A 1946 poll asking what Americans 
would like to have happen with health coverage found just 12% in support of having Social 
Security cover health costs, while 17% supported expanding voluntary coverage, 26% supported 
doing nothing, 11% wanted government insurance for the needy, with the rest supporting a 
variety of other options.18 When asked in that same poll whether their health care would improve 
under a government plan, 32% thought it would improve, 23% said it would stay the same, and 
35% thought it would worsen. Just 60% of Americans polled had heard of the Truman health 
plan, and only 37% had heard of the Wagner-Dingell-Murray legislation, which would have 
enacted it.19 Those that had heard of either were supportive of the plans.20  
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At that point, passage of Wagner-Dingell-Murray would have been consistent with the 
views of the American public at large. The best way of synthesizing these disparate results is that 
the American public was not opposed to government provided insurance. The public would have 
been satisfied had Social Security been expanded to include health insurance, but they were not 
particularly in support of doing so, as opposed to other means of increasing access to medical 
care. Lack of public support cannot be the reason the legislation failed. Therefore, even the more 
specific version of the national values argument with its emphasis on public opinion lacks 
empirical support.  
It is worth noting that these views shifted as the Truman presidency continued. In 1949, 
after the AMA campaign against the Truman plan was underway, 43% of Americans thought 
that their quality of care would decrease under a government plan, with 26% thinking it would 
improve and 19% thinking it would stay the same. When asked directly whether they would 
prefer the Truman government plan or the AMA’s plan of voluntary insurance, 47% preferred 
the AMA plan, with 33% preferring the Truman plan.21  
A comparison of public opinion in the United States and Great Britain provides limited 
support for the liberalism hypothesis. Britain had already developed a limited system of public 
health insurance, but it after World War 2 that the UK instituted its National Health Services. 
This was done with strong public support. A clear majority supported national health insurance 
in addition to a level of government control over medicine that was never seriously proposed in 
the United States. In 1943, 70% of the British public supported a state medical service, while a 
1944 poll found that 55% of Britons were in support. When given the option between the panel 
system (a limited system of public funding), complete state control, and private doctors, 55% of 
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Britons in a 1941 poll preferred complete state control.22 In both cases, the public wanted 
expanded access to health insurance, but the British public preferred a more active role for the 
government in the provision of care. These differences do provide at least some tentative support 
for the liberalism hypothesis, given the Americans’ hesitance towards state-run care. The 
differences in public opinion likely explain why there was no serious proposal to have a national 
health service in the United States, as was enacted in the United Kingdom in the late 1940’s.  
However, the fact remains that a majority of Americans supported including health insurance in 
Social Security, and that a majority who knew about efforts to do so supported those efforts. 
Public opinion thus cannot explain why, in Britain created its National Health Service after the 
war, and the United States did not succeed in passing national health insurance.  
 At times, there has been strong popular opposition to a large government role in health 
insurance, the data from 1949 being the most demonstrable example. However, the above section 
demonstrates that Americans’ hesitance towards the Truman plan in 1949 was not the result of 
deep-seeded American values, but rather the product of historically specific circumstances. As 
these poll data show, “American values” can be consistent with support for government provided 
universal health insurance or with opposition to it. It may be the case that a particularly strong 
emphasis on individualism weakened Americans’ support for government health insurance, and 
particularly government provided care, relative to European countries. It is also the case that 
individualist, anti-statist ideology was an ideological resource used by opponents of government 
health insurance.23 It is not the case that a distinct American ideology precluded support for, or 
passage of, government provided health insurance.  
                                                                
22 Cantril, Public Opinion 1935-1946, 441-443. 
23 Quadagno and Street. “Ideology and Public Policy: Antistatism in American Welfare State 
Transformation,” Journal of Policy History 17, no. 1 (2005), 53-54. 
22 
  
The Role of Interest Groups 
 A third theoretical approach to the welfare state brings attention to the role of interest 
groups in the shaping of health policy. The relative importance of interest groups varies over 
time, although some are consistently influential. Organized labor and organized medicine have 
been crucial players throughout the twentieth and early twenty first centuries, with health 
insurance companies becoming key in the second half of the twentieth century. The interest 
group approach views health policy as resulting from the power dynamics between these groups. 
Labor unions have been the most powerful backers of national health insurance, with organized 
medicine and the health insurance companies its most powerful and dedicated opponents. 
Proponents of the interest group approach argue that since organized labor is relatively weak in 
the United States, it has been unable to fulfill its demands for universal coverage.24  
The working class and the labor unions that represent them are typically key players in 
the formation of welfare states, either through their direct involvement or through the threat of 
instability.25 It follows that to understand divergences between welfare states, it is necessary to 
look at differences in working class power. This view is put most succinctly with regards to 
health insurance by Vincente Navarro, who argues that “the establishment of a national health 
program in any country is related primarily to the establishment and influence of the labor 
movement in that country, realized through labor’s economic (unions) and political (parties) 
instruments”.26 This model would predict a relationship between the strength of unions and 
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working class parties, the passage of government health insurance, and the level of 
decommodification with regards to healthcare. It is important to distinguish between strong and 
weak versions of this argument. Navarro’s claim that variation in national health insurance 
policies is caused “primarily” by the labor movement is the strong version of the labor 
movement argument. The weak version of the argument is that labor movement strength has a 
substantial impact on variation in national health programs, although it is not necessarily the 
primary factor. 
Working class power matters for welfare state formation broadly and health policy 
specifically, but Navarro’s claim that interstate variation in health policy can be explained 
“primarily” by differences in class power is more a more difficult claim to support. He provides 
a table which he argues shows that social insurance follows the development of the formation of 
a socialist party and trade unions. However, the table does not support his argument. In five of 
the twelve countries, a major social insurance program preceded the formation of either a 
socialist party or a major trade union federation.27 Navarro’s own data demonstrate that welfare 
states do not only form in response to strong unions or socialist parties. Navarro’s “social 
insurance” is not limited to health policy, and it could be the case that health insurance has its 
own logic distinct from that of other social insurance programs. Nonetheless, the strong labor 
movement argument proposed by Navarro simply does not have sufficient evidence.   
With regards to the United States, the working-class power model has come under 
criticism by scholars of other traditions. Theda Skocpol, a proponent of institutionalism in a 
comparison of the different paths taken by welfare states in the US and the UK after World War 
2, argues that differences in labor movement strength are insufficient to explain the different 
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policy outcomes. She claims that since the density rate in the US was increasing faster than in the 
UK, and the US had more strikes during and after the war, a labor-centric approach would expect 
the US to have developed a more extensive welfare state in the post-war period. She interprets 
the development of a strong welfare state in the UK at that time as evidence against a labor-
centric approach.  
Skocpol’s account of labor movement strength ignores the actual size in membership. 
British union density was about twice the size of American union density from before World 
War 2 to immediately afterwards, a fact she leaves to a footnote.28 . Regardless of the frequency 
of strikes (the higher strike rate in the US during the war is probably a consequence of the lack of 
direct threat to the American homeland), the larger size of British unions would be expected to 
contribute to a more expansive welfare state, as was the case. It is unclear why Skocpol uses “the 
growth of unions or the launching of strikes” is a better measure of the impact of unions then 
membership figures, particularly because strikes can be launched from a position of weakness, 
and do not necessarily reflect strength. Contrary to Skocpol’s argument, the comparative case of 
the US and UK after the war provides support for a working-class power approach, particularly if 
the presence in Britain of a genuine labor party is taken into account. Some version of the weak 
labor argument is therefore a plausible explanation for the post-war divergences between the two 
countries’ welfare states.   
In the United States, unions’ political power reached their peak in the years after World 
War II, their success in negotiating for private insurance and their organizational divisions 
weakened their ability and resolve to psuh for a single payer health insurance system at that time. 
Since then, unions’ economic and political influence has declined, with union density dropping 
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from around 33% at the end of World War 2 to 10.7% in 2016.29 Nonetheless, unions have 
continued to play a major role in health policy in the years since the Truman effort, providing 
critical support for Medicare and the Affordable Care Act.30  The drop in union density has 
weakened working class political power and has made the passage of a universal government 
health insurance program less likely.  
The typical counterpart to the role of labor unions is that of major corporations. There is a 
tradition in welfare state theory which argues that welfare states emerge due to the needs of 
corporations and other elite forces. Rather than a victory for the working class, the welfare state 
is viewed as a way of preventing workers from gaining influence. 19th century Germany is the 
paradigmatic example of this model, as Bismarck created the first modern welfare state as a way 
of consoling the industrial working class and providing security for the regime.31 In the context 
of the New Deal United States, debate over this model usually focuses on the passage of Social 
Security, and the role of corporate reformers in its passage.32 The New Deal more broadly can be 
viewed as an effort by President Roosevelt to save capitalism from radical forces on the right and 
left by providing relief from the Depression, although this may exaggerate the dangers to 
capitalism present at the time.33 However, much of the opposition to the New Deal came from 
the elite and from big business, suggesting that if Roosevelt was saving capitalism, the capitalists 
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were not aware of it. Additionally, there were elements of the New Deal, such as the National 
Labor Relations Act, which clearly went against the long term interests of corporations. 
This is a heavily debated paradigm with regards to health insurance as well. Marie 
Gottschalk argues that internationally, corporations had little role in the passage of government 
health insurance programs. Gottschalk uses the German case as evidence against the corporate 
influence argument, since Bismarck was not a representative of the capitalist class.34 Navarro, by 
contrast, argues that universal health insurance is supported by corporations to legitimize and 
strengthen the capitalist system in response to working class demands from below.35 This view 
needs empirical evidence however. Even if we accept the argument, it leaves unanswered the 
question of how influential corporations actually are. If corporations acquiesce to the 
development of social programs they otherwise would not support due to working class power, it 
seems odd to conclude, as Navarro does, that corporate political power is hegemonic.36  
The corporate landscape with regards to healthcare was vastly different in the 1930’s then 
it would be just two decades later, as private health insurance was still in its infancy. 
Corporations took less of an interest in insurance policy. Even those corporations involved in 
crafting Social Security were more eager for a national pension system than in health 
insurance.37 For this reason, scholars have not given as much attention to the role of corporations 
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in shaping health policy in the 1930’s and 1940’s as they have for later periods. Corporate 
influence could partially explain the failure of government health insurance proposals, although 
such an explanation would have to contend with the presence of a far more visible anti-reform 
lobby: the American Medical Association.  
The AMA is frequently credited with defeating Truman’s health care policy, but their 
influence is not limited to that single moment. The threat of the AMA’s involvement hung over 
plans made under Roosevelt to push for government insurance, a threat that was realized in the 
1940’s when President Truman pushed for national health insurance. After defeating Truman’s 
effort, the AMA has lost political influence. They were unable to stop Medicare, and while still a 
powerful lobby they lack the power to dictate power they once held. Few scholars would doubt 
that the AMA has had a crucial role in the shaping of health policy, particularly in the 1930’s and 
1940’s. The questions to ask are with regards to its importance relative to other factors, and to 
the reasons why the AMA had the influence it did.  
Institutionalism 
 Institutionalist approaches focus on the role of US government institutions in shaping the 
development of public policy. This includes elements of American politics such as the role of 
committee chairmen, the Senatorial filibuster, the role of political parties, and federalism. The 
general argument made is that these institutions impeded the development of universal health 
insurance. The committee chairman system gave a large amount of power to a small number of 
legislators. During the Jim Crow era, these were frequently conservative southern Democrats 
who obtained seniority due to uncompetitive elections.38 Although the chairman system has since 
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been reformed, for decades it gave disproportionate power to legislators skeptical of government 
health insurance programs.39  
The filibuster makes any successful legislation require a super-majority in the Senate, as 
opposed to the simple majority required in most other legislatures. This makes it more difficult to 
pass major pieces of legislation, particularly those that are ideologically divisive and would be 
unlikely to attract substantial bi-partisan support. The filibuster has clearly not prevented the 
passage of all major social legislation, so its influence should not be overstated. It has, however, 
prevented a small legislative majority from passing such legislation. Either a party needs to have 
overwhelming control in the Senate, as was the case for the Democrats in 1935 with the passage 
of Social Security, or it needs to find support in the opposing party, possibly making 
compromises along the way, as was the case with the passage of Medicare.40 The filibuster is 
thus one institutional feature of the US political process which has worked against the creation of 
national health insurance.  
Particularly significant is the American party system. In countries like Canada with a 
system of party discipline, members of parliament from a particular party have to vote for 
legislation supported by that party’s leaders.41 If that party is in the majority, it can thus pass the 
legislation it wishes without intra-party defections. This streamlines the legislative process and 
makes passing major pieces of legislation easier. In the United States, individual members of 
Congress can and frequently do vote against the wishes of their party leaders. Opponents of 
legislation do not have to pressure party leaders, but can instead convince individual members of 
Congress. In the case of health insurance, intra-party splits in the Democratic Party were a 
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critical reason why the Truman plan failed, as southern Democrats refused to get on board with 
the legislation. Maioni argues that a more centralized party system would have been more likely 
to result in successful health insurance legislation during that period.42 One counterpoint to that 
argument is that it assumes southern Democrats would have stayed in the Democratic Party if 
they lacked the flexibility to oppose northern Democrats on key votes that went against white 
Southern interests on civil rights. Counterfactually, a more centralized party system would likely 
have resulted in a distinct Southern party that would have  likely opposed government health 
insurance efforts.  
Institutionalism need not be in conflict with interest-group approaches. Indeed, 
institutionalist scholars have noted the interaction between US political institutions and interest 
groups. The US party system has made it easier to apply pressure to elected representatives, thus 
augmenting the power of interest groups.43 If we accept the argument that interest groups have 
played a major role in preventing the passage of national health insurance, it is still necessary to 
explain why those interest groups are more powerful in the United States than in countries such 
as Canada or the United Kingdom. Thus, institutionalism can complement the interest groups 
discussed earlier, particularly with its insights on the impacts of party structure.  
 A second major component of the US party system is its two-party nature and the lack of 
a working class political party. In Canada, proponents of national health insurance channeled 
their efforts into a populist party dedicated to its passage.44 Third party efforts in the United 
States have constantly failed, and instead proponents of universal health insurance have 
channeled their efforts into working in the Democratic Party. Although northern Democrats 
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supported national health insurance in the 1940’s, their support since then has been haphazard at 
best. The lack of a labor party was not a crucial factor in the 1930’s or 1940’s, but the right-ward 
shift in the Democratic Party since then has worked against the passage of national health 
insurance.45 
 One of the crucial elements in the US constitutional system is the presence of federalism, 
which gives a large role to state governments in the formation of social policy. The role of 
federalism in the history of American health insurance reform efforts is complex. Whereas 
comparative scholars who examine the Canadian case argue that Canada’s relatively 
decentralized federalism aided public health insurance efforts, comparative scholars with a focus 
on Europe argue that the United States’ relative decentralization has resulted in a smaller welfare 
state overall.46 Comparative statistical analyses have found that federal states do tend to have 
lower levels of social welfare than unitary states.47 However, indepth case studies have found 
that the relationship between federalism and the welfare state is more varied, with federalism at 
times making it easier to increase the size of the welfare state.48 This has been the case with the 
Canadian healthcare system. In Canada, provinces had a major role in the creation of government 
health insurance, with Saskatchewan’s public insurance serving as a major impetus for the 
federal government to get involved in creating a minimum standard of insurance by which all 
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provinces have to abide.49 The simplistic argument that federalism itself made it harder to pass 
national health insurance in the United States is thus not tenable, although it is possible that the 
particular variety of federalism found in the US impeded national health insurance efforts. It 
could also be possible that federalism has made it easier to create single-payer, and that the 
failure of single-payer plans is despite, not because of, federalism. 
 Federalism has historically offered opportunities for the single-payer advocates. Rather 
than having to convince a national government with competing regional interests, advocates 
could start by winning single-payer in a single state first, using that state as a “laboratory of 
democracy” with the idea that the model would then spread to other states and perhaps then to 
the national government, as happened in Canada. Reformers have tried this, on several 
occasions. State level action was attempted in the 1910’s, failing narrowly in the New York 
legislature.50 It was attempted again in the 1940’s in California, reportedly failing by just a single 
vote.51 It has been tried again in recent years in Vermont, with the legislature actually having 
passed a single-payer plan only to decide later that it was not financially feasible.52    
 Some of the explanations that have been used to explain the failure of single payer 
nationally are not as applicable at the state level. For example, many of the states where there 
have been major single payer efforts have particularly strong labor movements. In California, 
labor union density in the 1950’s was above 40%, similar to the rate in the United Kingdom at 
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the time its National Health Service was created.53 New York has historically had some of the 
highest union densities of any state, although Vermont’s union density in recent years has been 
roughly the national average.54 This evidence can be interpreted in two major ways. First, that 
strong labor unions do make it more likely that single payer insurance will be on the political 
agenda, and make it more likely to pass. Secondly, that high rates of union membership are not 
themselves sufficient to pass single payer insurance, given that those states which have had 
density rates in line with those of countries with single payer have not themselves passed it. This 
suggests that although the strength of the labor movement matters, the weakness of unions has 
not been the only or primary feature of American politics preventing the passage of national 
health insurance.  
Institutionalist theorists consistently use the concept of path dependency, which refers to 
past outcomes constraining future possibilities.55 One particularly relevant example in the 
development of health policy is long term consequences of the rapid expansion of private 
insurance in the 1940’s, discussed in the introduction. There is some disagreement among 
scholars about the scope of the effects of the high rates of private insurance; Boychuk argues that 
Canada’s rates of private insurance were also high when it passed government health insurance.56 
Steinmo and Watts argue that the main factors stopping universal insurance in the 1970’s was the 
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impact of political institutions, rather than a lack of demand for it.57 Overall, however, the 
literature on the conglomeration of private benefits regulated and at times subsidized via tax 
policy, which has been labeled the “private welfare state”, suggests that it leads to less demand 
for public programs, such as government health insurance.58 Any explanation for the failure of 
universal public health insurance must come to grips with the fact that private insurance has 
accomplished much of what early reformers hoped public insurance would do. Or, as Madison 
argues, “the most effective argument against the Truman plan was that social health insurance 
wasn’t needed, because soon everyone would be covered by voluntary, private health 
insurance.”59 In actuality, “everyone” would not be covered, but those without coverage tended 
to have less political influence and lacked the ability to enact national health insurance.  
The Role of Contingent Explanations 
 Whereas sociologists and political scientists have tended to focus on larger structural and 
cultural explanations for the United States’ distinctive healthcare system, the explanation of any 
historical event also has immediate causes. For example, it has been argued that part of the 
reason health insurance did not pass under FDR was that the president lacked an interest in the 
issue equal to his interest in pensions.60 The American Association for Labor Legislation’s health 
insurance campaign ran into bad timing, as it emerged as progressivism was declining, as  well 
                                                                
57 Steinmo and Watts, “It’s the Institutions, Stupid! Why Comprehensive National Health Insurance 
Always Fails in America,” 355.  
However, Steinmo and Watts’ argument ignores that the proposals on the political agenda in the 1970’s 
would have kept a major role for private insurance, suggesting that there were path dependency effects 
limiting the scope of options.  
58 Stevens, “Blurring the Boundaries: How the Federal Government Has Influenced Welfare Benefits in 
the Private Sector,” 145-148.  
59 Donald L. Madison “From Bismarck to Medicare – A Brief History of Medical Care Payment in 
America,” 54.  
60 David Blumenthal and James A. Morone, The Heart of Power: Health and Politics in the Oval Office, 
(Berkeley, University of California Press, 2009), 56.  
34 
  
as the American entry into World War 1.61 The particular character and ideology of Samuel 
Gompers had a major impact on the position of the AFL towards health insurance.  
 These contingent explanations have a crucial role in understanding the dynamics of a 
particular reform effort. As we have discussed with the impact of rising insurance rates, any 
contingent events that led to initial failure would have made subsequent reform less likely. It is 
plausible that these contingent events did shape the long-term development of health policy in 
the United States. However, it would be a mistake to view the outcome of a century of policy 
debates on health insurance as merely the result of chance and contingent events. There are deep-
seeded aspects to the American political system, from the institution of the Senate, the committee 
system to the relative power of the working class, that have on balance made the passage of 
universal health insurance less likely. No one factor on its own is determinative. Together, 
however, they have raised the bar so that only in the presence of multiple favorable contingent 
factors would the passage of national health insurance be possible. Notwithstanding the increase 
in the number of insured people following the passage of the Affordable Care Act, such a 
moment has not yet occurred. The two following chapters explore two periods where the passage 
of national health insurance seemed plausible, the Roosevelt and Truman presidencies.  
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Chapter 2: The Roosevelt Presidency and Health Insurance 
President Franklin Roosevelt’s term in office offered two major opportunities to pass 
universal health insurance. The first of these was during the run-up to the passage of the Social 
Security Act of 1935, with high level officials considering including health insurance in the Act. 
The second major moment was in the late 30’s, which saw the National Health Conference and 
the introduction of the first Wagner health bill in 1939. The Roosevelt era is of particular 
significance in the history of health insurance policy; Roosevelt’s was the first administration to 
back universal health insurance, and 1939 saw the first national universal health insurance bill.  
The New Deal provided opportunities for substantial changes in social policy. The New 
Deal did not create the US welfare state, as the US government had already engaged in large 
welfare programs, such as the national pension for Civil War veterans. Nonetheless, the policy 
legacy of the New Deal is substantial, having brought about Social Security, unemployment 
insurance, and a Keynesian state far more willing to intervene in the economy. Even in the realm 
of health care itself, the New Deal saw an expanded government role, with the Farm Security 
Administration providing healthcare to 600,000 people, mostly in rural states.1 Why then was 
health insurance “the lost reform” of the New Deal?  
 If prior to the New Deal health care was difficult for many Americans to procure, the 
Depression greatly worsened the problem. Tens of millions of people simply lacked the funds to 
pay physicians.2 Although doctors had traditionally allowed poor people to receive care for free 
or at a reduced rate, the lower levels of national income meant that physicians were not able to 
do this for sufficient numbers of people.3 Public hospitals were over capacity, while private 
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hospitals were unable to find patients able to pay.4 It was a public health disaster.5 Medicine was 
not the only societal institution under severe stress during the Depression.  President Roosevelt 
had to prioritize certain issues at the expense of others. During the most formative years of the 
New Deal, health insurance never rose to the top of the agenda.  
The Committee For Economic Security  
 To design a national pension system, President Roosevelt had Secretary of Labor Francis 
Perkins lead the Committee on Economic Security, which was to issue a report proposing policy 
to strengthen economic security, defined as “protection of the individual against the many 
hazards which often result in destitution,” and viewed by the Committee as the “fundamental 
objective of the New Deal.” 6 The work of the CES was shaped by the Great Depression, and the 
Committee was most interested in aspects that would address economic conditions directly, such 
as unemployment insurance. The CES did have a mandate to include health issues, including 
insurance, as sickness was said to contribute to economic insecurity. The CES initial report 
contained several suggestions related to public health, including additional federal funds for local 
public health programs, and adding personnel to the Public Health Service.7 The CES report not 
only covered public health, however, but also included a discussion on the need for health 
insurance. At the time, private insurance was itself a controversial matter, as it disrupted the 
traditional fee-for-service method of collecting payments. The CES report defended the principle 
of private health insurance, noting that it was “neither new nor novel,” but argued that voluntary 
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insurance was too expensive for a large percentage of the population.8 Thus, as a method of 
securing health access to the general population, “voluntary insurance holds no promise of being 
much more effective in the near future than it has been in the past.”9 Only a system of 
compulsory insurance, the CES argued, would be sufficient to provide health insurance for the 
general public. The CES report failed to include any specifics as to how compulsory insurance 
might work, instead noting that it had been tried in other countries. Alternatively, the CES was to 
continue collaborating with the AMA and other professional groups to come up with an 
acceptable plan, which the CES said was not yet finished.10 Absent a proposal from the CES, 
health insurance was not included in the Social Security Act.  
 The absence of health insurance from the CES report should not be understood as a 
consequence of the technical necessity in needing more time to draft a proposal. President 
Roosevelt’s actions suggest that it was strategic considerations which determined the course of 
health insurance in the CES. In November of 1934, the father-in-law of Roosevelt’s son James, 
Dr. Harvey Cushing, wrote to Roosevelt asking him to delay any health proposals, noting the 
position taken by the AMA.11 Instead, Cushing asked “Could the organization of such a 
department or bureau be taken under consideration at this time, the discussion of this difficult 
project regarding sickness insurance might well be postponed until a department was in existence 
which could properly and permanently administer it.”12 This was a subtle move by Cushing, an 
opponent of national health insurance, to weaken the efforts of proponents. Roosevelt listened to 
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his advice, forwarding the Cushing letter to Perkins, and asking her to begin to set up an 
interdepartmental committee on health and welfare.13 Roosevelt said in a cabinet meeting, when 
asked to include sick pay insurance in the Social Security bill, that he did not want any additional 
items to be added to it.14 A March 1935 letter to the President from the sub-committee on 
responsibility for health insurance asked him to reconsider this position.15 The justification given 
in the report for health insurance’s absence is therefore not the most likely explanation. Health 
insurance’s exclusion from Social Security was a political decision, not the consequence of 
needing more time to formulate a proposal.  
The most plausible alternative rationale for health insurance’s exclusion from the CES 
report is an interest group explanation which focuses on the role of the AMA. When word spread 
that the CES was considering including health insurance in Social Security, the AMA responded 
with strong outcry at the thought of such a policy.16 Passing a Social Security bill with a health 
insurance provision over the opposition of the AMA may have been possible, but it would have 
been more difficult than passing the bill without such a provision. Members of the CES were 
cognizant of the difficulties a Social Security bill with health insurance would have had in 
passing Congress.17 Health insurance had never been the priority of Roosevelt, whose main goals 
from Social Security were unemployment insurance and a pension plan.18 Given that including 
health insurance would imperil the passage of the provisions deemed more important, it made 
strategic sense for health insurance to be excluded from the bill. Other provisions of the Social 
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Security Act elicited opposition, but there was no organized, respected profession whose 
traditional practice was encumbered by those provisions in the way that national health insurance 
would have changed the medical profession. This made Social Security far easier to pass than 
would have been the case had it included health insurance. The political power of the AMA, 
along with the direct link that it had to FDR through Dr. Cushing, is thus crucial to 
understanding why health insurance was excluded from Social Security legislation.  
Interest group theory by itself cannot explain why Roosevelt gave a higher priority to 
unemployment insurance and pensions than to health insurance. There are a range of plausible 
factors. The lack of prioritization of health insurance could reasonably be the consequence of 
President Roosevelt’s personal priorities, shaped by his own experiences with the medical 
profession.19  A second plausible type of explanation would focus on the economic conditions of 
the time. The veritable crisis of employment in the midst of the Depression likely contributed to 
unemployment insurance’s prioritization. Although there was a need for action on health 
insurance, solving unemployment was the more pressing problem. Finally, Beland and Hacker 
argue that part of the reason why health insurance was lower on reformers’ agenda was that it 
had already failed in the 1910’s, creating the sense that it would be politically difficult to pass. 
This moves beyond simple interest group politics to add that the perception of interest group 
power has policy consequences. Additionally, they argue that there was a lack of popular 
mobilization for health insurance to the extent that there was with old-age pensions, thus creating 
fewer political incentives to prioritize health insurance.20 
Several of these explanations need to be combined to understand the Roosevelt’s 
administration’s priorities. Roosevelt himself had backed government health programs as 
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governor of New York, comparing the state’s responsibilities in health to its responsibilities in 
education, so this was not an unfamiliar issue to him. 21 He had not been at the forefront of 
universal health insurance proposals, but he had enough familiarity with the topic to understand 
its importance. This suggests that Roosevelt’s hesitance in including health insurance had more 
to do with the political ramifications than with an individual lack of interest, even if he 
hypothetically could have given it a higher level of prioritization.  
The lack of mass mobilization pointed to by Beland and Hacker is a far more crucial 
explanation. A social movement in favor of universal health insurance would have changed the 
White House’s political calculations, and thus may well have led to health insurance’s inclusion 
in Social Security. The lack of popular mobilization is related to the relatively weak level of 
institutionalization of the labor movement at the time, as the Social Security Act was formulated 
prior to the passage of the pro-union Wagner Act. Unions were actively organizing throughout 
1934 and early 1935, after being weakened severely by the Great Depression, but they were not 
in a position to push heavily for legislation not directly related to their well-being.22 However, 
the importance of the lack of mass mobilization should not be overstated, as national health 
insurance was passed in Great Britain and Canada without it.   
Beland and Hacker’s argument regarding the impact of previous policy proposals is 
intriguing, but the case is overstated, as it ignores efforts to expand health access in the 1920’s, 
such as the 1921 Sheppard-Towner Act, and the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care. It also 
avoids discussing the earlier efforts in the 1910’s to pass workers’ pensions. Indeed, it was the 
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same organization, the American Association for Labor Legislation, which led both the health 
insurance and pension efforts of that time.23 Beland and Hacker do not address the possible 
consequences of the earlier failures of pension plans, significantly weakening their argument.  
The Interdepartmental Committee and the Wagner Bill  
 The 1934 letter from Cushing asked Roosevelt not just to delay any health insurance 
program, but to set up a proper department or agency to run the federal government’s health 
efforts. Roosevelt’s letter to Perkins later that year started a process of setting up a committee to 
begin that coordination. Roosevelt followed up with a 1936 executive order, issued days before 
Roosevelt’s reelection, which created the Interdepartmental Committee to Coordinate Health and 
Welfare Activities.24 Josephine Roche, an official in the Treasury Department, was chosen to 
lead the Committee. The initial stated goal of the IC was to coordinate work already done, and to 
issue proposals leading towards departmental reorganization for better coordination.25  The 
Interdepartmental Committee soon went beyond that mandate, and instead, with Roosevelt’s 
approval, issued a proposal for significantly expanding government’s role in health care.  
 Unlike the Committee on Economic Security’s ultimate decision to exclude any concrete 
policy ideas on health insurance, the Interdepartmental Committee issued a set of five proposals 
on health policy. These proposals, in order, were an expansion public health programs, hospital 
construction, health care for the indigent, a general health program, and insurance for sick pay.26 
Of these, only the indigent health care and the general health program directly concern the 
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provision of care, although the fact that the proposal was part of a broader rethinking of health 
care in the United States is consequential.  
The Interdepartmental Committee’s report found that 40 million Americans had low 
incomes and were in obvious need of financial assistance in paying for medical care. To address 
this program, the IC called for “federal grants-in-aid to the states toward the costs of a medical 
care program for recipients of public assistance and other medically needy persons.”27 This 
program would include both those on public assistance, and those not on assistance but unable to 
afford care.28 Medical care provided would include “minimum essential needs,” including 
“medical and surgical care… hospitalization, exclusive of the period of maternity, and of care of 
the tuberculous and mentally diseased; bedside nursing care; and emergency dental care.”29 
States would have significant flexibility in shaping programs to their liking, with the federal 
government setting minimum standards that needed to be met if a state was to receive federal 
funds. A state could, presumably, decide to not set up a program at all if it wished.   
The general program of medical care was formulated separately from medical care for the 
indigent. This probably related to FDR’s general dislike for programs that put people on the dole, 
as opposed to programs, like Social Security, in which people become eligible for benefits by 
putting money into the system.30 The conceptual difference was that poor people were simply 
unable to afford care, whereas the working and middle class could afford care, but “the costs 
must be spread among groups of people and over periods of time,” through the insurance 
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principle.31 It also might have been thought to be politically easier to pass a proposal for medical 
care for poor people than for a general medical program.32 Like the program for the poor, the 
general medical program was to in actuality be a set of forty-eight different state systems, with 
substantial financial contributions from the federal government. States could set up programs as 
they pleased, including a program of universal insurance, or a system in which medical care is 
provided directly by the government, and could set up an income limit beyond which an 
individual would not be eligible for the program.33  Similar to the CES report, the IC proposal 
argued that voluntary insurance would be unable to cover a substantial enough portion of wage-
earners.34 Despite separating the proposals for a general medical program from the indigent care 
proposal, the IC report argues in favoring of having a general medical program for all regardless 
of indigent status, comparing it to public education accessible to all.35 
Upon receiving the IC’s report and its health policy proposals in March 1938, President 
Roosevelt wrote to Roche to suggest “that your Committee give consideration to the desirability 
of inviting at some appropriate time representatives of the interested public and of the medical 
and other professions” to discuss health care problems and solutions.36 Roche acted on 
Roosevelt’s proposal, initiating the National Health Conference held in July of that year. The 
Interdepartmental Committee invited key stakeholders from across the medical and lay worlds. 
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Representatives of the major medical organizations, such as the American Pharmaceutical 
Association, the American Hospital Association, and the American Medical Association, were 
present, as were representatives from organized labor, religious organizations, rural 
organizations, consumer groups, women’s groups, black groups, and even the National Congress 
of Parents and Teachers.37 Business representatives were also present but were not particularly 
active in the discussions. Roche told attendees that the goal of the conference was to determine 
the country’s health needs, and to formulate policies that would lead to better cooperation to 
meet those needs.38 In actuality, Roche hoped to reach a consensus for the Interdepartmental 
Committee’s plan.   
The response to the Conference was mostly positive. Groups from across the country 
wrote to the Interdepartmental Committee, giving their thoughts on the IC’s proposal. The most 
frequent supporters of the plan were labor unions. Not a single union which wrote to the 
Interdepartmental Committee opposed the plan, and support came not only from national unions 
but from many locals as well. This is notable because of the divisions within the labor movement 
at the time. Both the CIO, which had strong social democratic roots, and the AFL, with its 
traditional attitude of not relying on the state, supported a national health insurance program by 
the time of the Conference. Support came from other organizations amenable to government 
intervention, like the National Lawyers Guild.  
Sensing the need to support some changes, the key players in the medical industry 
supported parts of the plan, but not the entirety of the program. Groups like the AMA needed to 
balance their institutional interests with the growing popular and elite support for expanded 
government intervention in the health sector. This led AMA president Irvin Abell to argue at the 
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Conference that “there can be no acceptance by the medical profession of any system of medical 
care which is based on the idea that the well-to-do shall receive one quality of medical care while 
the farmer, the laborer, and the white-collar worker are to be placated with a wider distribution of 
an inferior medical service.”39 Egalitarian rhetoric was necessary to stave off popular discontent, 
even though the fee-for-service preferred by the AMA allowed for the wealthy to receive higher 
quality care than others. The AMA’s stated sympathy for the goals of reformers was not just 
rhetorical, as the AMA endorsed the principles of all parts of the Interdepartmental Committee’s 
plan, with the exception of the proposal for the general medical program. On the question of a 
general medical program, the AMA’s opposition was unequivocal. The committee tasked with 
responding to the proposal found that compulsory insurance would lead to a “complicated, 
bureaucratic system… which has no place in a democratic state,” to increased taxes and 
government spending, and would lend itself to political control and manipulation.40 The AMA 
was prepared to give ground on other health related matters, but not on compulsory insurance.  
The National Medical Association, the professional association for black doctors with a 
typically more progressive attitude than the AMA, endorsed the other proposals except for a 
general medical program. Its stated reason was that it did not want to jeopardize the other 
components of the plan by including a national health program, suggesting that in a more 
favorable political environment it might have endorsed the entire proposal.41  The NMA’s 
hesitance was also related to the unclear racial implications of the proposal. Although the report 
discusses racial disparities in health outcomes, it was unknown whether the federal government 
                                                                
39 Abell, Irvin. “No Title.” in Proceedings of the National Health Conference, 8. 
40 Walter Donaldson, “Report of Reference Committee on Consideration of the National Health 
Program.” American Medical Association, (1938), 3.  
41 George Bowles, “Recommendations of a Special Committee of the National Medical Association to the 
Technical Committee on Medical Care.” Washington D.C.: National Medical Association, (1938), 1. 
46 
  
would fund states which restricted blacks’ ability to access care under the program. The editor of 
the NMA journal reported that although many black doctors were skeptical of the AMA and its 
racial biases, they trusted state governments even less.42  
This issue also concerned the NAACP, whose chairman wrote to Roche after the 
Conference asking that she ensure that there be no Jim Crow elements in the health program.43  
The Committee of Physicians for the Improvement of Medical Care, a group of dissident 
doctors, were critical of the AMA’s position, particularly their disregard for the health needs of 
the middle-class and their assumption that “defects in the present health service can not be 
attributed to the methods by which medical care is provided by physicians.”44 Like the NMA, the 
Committee of Physicians did not endorse recommendation four. Although the Committee of 
Physicians supported the recommendation’s principles, it did not think that the use of 
compulsory insurance at the present moment was appropriate, leaving the possibility open that it 
would support compulsory insurance at a later moment. Both the NMA and the Committee of 
Physicians expressed a greater potential willingness to support national insurance than the AMA, 
but neither was willing to endorse the specific proposal of the Interdepartmental Committee. 
Thus, the two doctors’ groups which were in a position to challenge the AMA’s claim to speak 
for all US doctors did not do so with regards to the IC’s national health program proposal.  
The American Hospital Association was sympathetic to the goals of the conference plan, 
although their support for increased hospital construction was tentative and applicable only in 
locations with truly demonstrable need. The AHA did not take a position on the general medical 
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program.45 The other two major hospital organizations, representing Protestant and Catholic 
hospitals, respectively, opposed any plan for compulsory insurance.46 A joint statement by the 
three hospital associations stated that they did not have a consensus on compulsory insurance, 
but that they thought voluntary insurance would be able to cover people with a range of 
incomes.47 Similarly, the American Dental Association pushed its own interests in terms of 
supporting the inclusion of dental programs in all components of the plan, but did not take a 
position on the comprehensive national health program.48 Some groups were less concerned 
about the details of the proposal. The American Pharmaceutical Association, for example, 
expressed its desire that everyone should be able to get care and that patients keep their choice of 
doctor.49 The American Nurses Association and the American Public Health Association took 
similar positions, stating support for the conference’s proposals without specifically taking a 
position on compulsory health insurance.50 
There was some criticism from the political left. The American League for Public 
Medicine, formally known as the Medical League for Socialized Medicine, refused to support 
the Interdepartmental Committee’s proposal because of its inclusion of compulsory health 
insurance.51 The American League would only support a truly public medical program in which 
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care would be provided directly by government institutions, as with education.52 This position 
was not expressed by other organizations, although a few individuals expressed criticism of the 
plan for having insufficient government intervention.53  
In the aftermath of the conference, administration officials wished to have legislative 
action on the Interdepartmental Committee’s proposal. President Roosevelt sent the IC’s report 
to Congress in January of 1939 with his own message on health security, which emphasized the 
leeway given to state governments in the plan.54  Senator Robert Wagner of New York was at 
that point working on a legislative version of the proposal, which was introduced in February.55 
As the chief sponsor of the legislation, Wagner took on an increasingly prominent role in serving 
as a spokesman for the national health program.   
The bill did not make progress legislatively. There were hearings, but the bill did not 
advance out of committee, with a committee report released in September calling for action on 
the bill after further study.56 Although Wagner did not give up on the bill after the start of war in 
Europe in September, the war did distract from his efforts as political attention shifted to events 
abroad. President Roosevelt continued to push for some form of health legislation, writing to 
Frances Perkins in November of 1940 to reformulate the Committee on Economic Security’s 
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recommendations and to send them to him by January.57 This was simply not a moment when 
national health insurance could be enacted, however, due to the focus on the war.  Although 
Wagner introduced a second version of the bill in 1943, the original moment of possible 
legislative action had already passed. Health insurance was going to have to wait until at least the 
end of war.  
The failure of the 1939 Wagner bill had immediate causes, particularly the onset of war, 
along with the poor showing of liberal Democrats’ in the 1938 mid-terms.58 The ideological 
composition of Congress was more skeptical of large New Deal programs in 1939 than it had 
been two years earlier. Additionally, President Roosevelt’s relationships with many Democrats, 
particularly those from the South, had soured.59 Congress was now a less hospitable environment 
for a national health program.  
The opposition to the Wagner bill frequently couched its language in traditional laissez-
faire liberalism. Concerns were brought up about the tyrannical nature of government 
bureaucracies, and the increase in governmental debt. This was the most common opposition 
framing in correspondence to Wagner and the Interdepartmental Committee. An example of this 
is the statement by Congressman Frederick Smith, a physician, in a radio discussion with 
Wagner. Smith argued that the advances of American medicine can be explained by its great 
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“human liberty and freedom from political restraint.”60 The Wagner bill, Smith claimed, would 
set up a massive bureaucracy, and would be doomed to fail, like any plan for “socialized 
medicine” because of human nature.61 It would be harder to find a more quintessentially liberal 
argument against national health insurance, one which has reverberated in later debates. 
There were other arguments as well, including one viscerally anti-Semitic letter sent to 
Wagner, opposing his support for the “Jew-Screw-Blue Deal.”62  The more traditional, 
conservative notion that private individual medical practice must be defended was not frequently 
used. This could be taken as evidence that the power of American liberalism had a causal role 
leading to the defeat of the Wagner bill, but to do so would be a mistake. Ideological 
configurations likely shaped the content of the debate over the bill, but they did not have a role in 
shaping policy outcomes. As described in chapter 1, the general public approved of proposals 
similar to the Wagner plan. The argument that American liberalism was a major contributor to 
the defeat of universal health insurance also ignores the extent to which proponents of expanded 
government action reframed liberal ideology to allow for their programs. Senator Wagner would 
frequently point to ways in which his proposal was in step with previous policies and American 
tradition, mentioning the 1798 bill giving health insurance to sailors.63 Supporters would argue 
that they were simply extending the principle of voluntary insurance, which had become 
increasingly accepted. Opponents would dispute this claim, such as writer George Morris’ 
comment “I am not entirely in accord with Senator Wagner’s statement that this proposal does 
not break with American tradition. I have never known the government to produce a doctor.”64 
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The liberalism thesis argues that principles of American liberalism would lead to rejection of a 
national health insurance program. The actual arguments used by supporters suggests that this 
cannot assumed to be the case, and that the meanings and implications of American liberalism 
were contested.  
Labor unions were the most frequent supporters of the Wagner bill. This was a moment 
of upsurge in labor, with the unions heavily invested in organizing basic industries like steel and 
automobiles.65 The unions, particularly those in the newly formed Congress of Industrial 
Organizations had not yet developed the dedicated political machinery they would use later to 
great success, although they were still politically active.66 The labor movement played a larger 
role in pushing for health insurance legislation than it had in the 1910’s, when AFL president 
Samuel Gompers refused to support national efforts, but it was still weak politically, compared to 
the post-war era. Unions sent their wishes of support, but they lacked the capacity to muscle a 
controversial health bill through Congress. Even if they had been able to, unions had some 
concerns over the specifics of the Wagner bill, especially the heavy role given to state 
governments. Unions were concerned that states less favorable to unions would create lower 
quality programs, but that those states would have better environments for business, leading to 
worse economic outcomes in the pro-union states.67 Derickson argues that organized labor was 
thus less active in pushing for the Wagner bill than they would have been with a more favorable 
piece of legislation.68 
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Business might have been expected to be strongly opposed to the Wagner bill, but instead 
they were largely indifferent. A representative from the American Molasses Company was 
present at the National Health Conference, and argued that “progressive business will regard an 
adequate health service as a subsidy to industry, not a burden.”69 The National Association of 
Broadcasters similarly supported the proposal, and offered to help in publicizing it.70 Both 
business statements are significant in that they lacked any attention to policy detail, issuing 
vague generalities of support rather than praise for particular aspects of the program. The 
Philadelphia Board of Trade wrote to Wagner in opposition to his bill, but there is not evidence 
that other business groups got involved. This could partially be the result of a selection bias in 
the records, as I did not examine the archives of leading opponents to the legislation. Businesses 
may well have corresponded with those more likely to be receptive to their views. However, 
even if this possibility is granted, the positions taken by the leading medical organizations are 
referred to constantly in the documents, both with their own statements and by others discussing 
their positions. Those medical groups which were concerned about elements of the 
Interdepartmental Committee’s proposal at least met with the IC, and sent resolutions to the IC in 
efforts to influence them.71 There is no comparable evidence of substantial interaction between 
business groups and the Interdepartmental Committee. This is consistent with Paul Starr’s 
account, which found that businesses rose in importance in health care debates during the second 
half of the twentieth century.72 There is little evidence to suggest that business groups played 
anything more than a marginal role in the health insurance debates of the late 1930’s.  
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The health insurance debate thus seems to poorly fit the model of a standoff between the 
forces of labor and capital. Organized labor was one of the major forces in support of the IC and 
Wagner proposals, simultaneous with several major organizing drives. Big business, by contrast, 
was nearly absent from the discussion. A class struggle model thus is inadequate to understand 
the health insurance policy outcomes of the time.  
American political institutions contributed to the defeat of the bill. The disproportionate 
power of Southern Democrats, and the inability of the president to coral his party members to 
support the bill, had a role in the failure of health insurance proposals under Roosevelt. The 
problem with focusing on them too heavily, however, is that these institutional parameters were 
able to be overcome throughout this period. The question thus becomes why was the path of 
health insurance different than the rest of the New Deal. The answer most easily supported by 
the evidence is that to have created universal insurance would have violated the core interests of 
a powerful lobbying group with professional legitimacy. President Roosevelt was not willing to 
risk the rest of his program on such a difficult fight.  
Conclusion 
The defeat for universal health insurance under Roosevelt happened in a particular 
historical context which, while better suited for the development of national health insurance 
than in the aftermath of the rise of private insurance, resulted in a limited window of opportunity. 
World War 2 cut short the growing momentum for national health insurance at the end of the 
1930’s, as the United States was not going to experiment with a new health insurance system 
with its impending entrance into war. During the Social Security debate, President Roosevelt did 
not want to jeopardize the entire bill by including a health insurance provision. By the time 
health insurance was back on the agenda, the Democrats had a slimmer majority in Congress, 
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and would have faced a more organized, well-funded opposition than had been the case with 
Social Security. The American Medical Association was so feared that it did not have to fully 
exert its political power through electoral campaigning during the Roosevelt era. Only with the 
ascension of President Truman, who prioritized the development of a national health insurance 
system, did the AMA have to fully exert its considerable financial and political resources.  
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Chapter 3: The Committee for the Nation’s Health and the Failure of Health Insurance 
Reform in the Post-War Era 
In many respects, the period following World War 2 was the most conducive to the 
passage of national health insurance. Labor unions were at their historic peak in density.1 The 
sitting president, Harry Truman, had spoken publicly and unequivocally about the need for 
national health insurance. Democrats controlled the Congress until the 1946 elections, and then 
again after 1948. Congress enacted other pieces of health reformers’ agenda, including funding 
for hospital construction, medical research, and medical education, but the goal of national health 
insurance continued to elude reformers.2 Yet the effort in the late 40’s to enact national health 
insurance failed. This chapter examines the history of that period in an effort to explain why the 
campaign failed, through a particular focus on the major advocacy group dedicated to supporting 
national health insurance, the Committee for the Nation’s Health (CNH). As the most influential 
organization of its type, the history and ultimate failure of the CNH provides insight into why 
national health insurance was not enacted during this period.  
The CNH coordinated the escalating campaign for national health insurance of the late 
1940’s. Founded in 1946, the CNH closed formally in 1958, although it had all but ceased to 
exist after 1956. Led by Michael Davis, a sociologist by training who had played a critical role in 
the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care in the 1920’s, the CNH partook in lobbying, public 
relations activities, and efforts to coordinate groups in favor of national health insurance. 3  
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 The CNH originated in a 1944 meeting called by Senator Robert Wager, the major 
congressional sponsor of national health insurance legislation. This group, called the Social 
Security Charter Committee, would turn into the Committee for the Nation’s Health two years 
later, in the aftermath of a speech President Truman gave on national health insurance.4 After 
that speech, 200 public figures signed a letter supporting Truman’s plan, which later ran as an 
advertisement.5 In January of 1946, those individuals began to form an organization, with the 
help of $40,000 in donations.6 The CNH incorporated on March 1 of that year, with the express 
purpose “to encourage, stimulate interest in, promote understanding of and generally to support 
the national health program proposed by the President of the United States... and to enlighten and 
direct public opinion to that end.”7 By November of 1946, the CNH had received 2,400 
donations.8  
The CNH began with leadership diverse in institutional affiliation. Several physicians 
were on its Board of Directors, with Dr. Channing Frothingham of Massachusetts the chairman 
of the organization.9 Two religious leaders were vice-chairs of the CNH, as were the presidents 
of the CIO and the AFL. There were several people heavily linked to the previous administration 
involved in the group, such as Jonathan Daniels, FDR’s press secretary, as well as Eleanor 
Roosevelt herself, a vice-chair. Business was represented by David Sarnoff, head of the Radio 
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Corporation of America, and Gerald Swope, leader of General Electric.10 There were several 
prominent lawyers as well, including the future Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas.11 The CNH 
brought together prominent individuals from key sectors of the society, from labor unions to 
medicine to business. The difficulty would be in coordinating these different forces. 
 This coalition was more paper-based than a real alliance. Big business, even as 
represented by Sarnoff and Swope, was never heavily involved in the CNH. Both the AFL and 
the CIO placed key figures inside the CNH’s leadership to help direct it, but there were no 
equivalent representatives from the major employers. Doctors, particularly Frothingham, were 
involved with the CNH, but the group never developed a substantial base of support among 
physicians. At one point, a speech by the CNH Executive Committee member and physician 
Theodore Sanders cited a poll showing that 25% of NY physicians supported national health 
insurance.12 This was taken as a sign that there was significant opposition to the AMA among 
physicians, reflecting the sorry state of the support among physicians for the CNH and national 
health insurance. The fact that only 25% of doctors in one of the most liberal states in the 
country supported national health insurance, and that this was seen as a promising statistic by the 
CNH, shows the extent to which the CNH lacked mass support from physicians.  
 The Committee for the Nation’s Health engaged in a variety of political activities in an 
attempt to garner support for national health insurance, many of which were oriented towards 
gaining elite support. Davis and donor Albert Lasker testified to Congress in 1947 in support of 
the Wagner-Murray-Dingell legislation.13 The CNH lobbied both parties to include support for 
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national health insurance in their 1948 party platforms, which was ultimately unsuccessful in 
both cases.14 The CNH also tried to increase popular support for national health insurance. This 
was done through a mass media campaign, and through responding in press to attacks by the 
AMA or other groups. The CNH would coordinate responses to criticisms of national health 
insurance and its proponents, getting multiple individuals to issue responses in particularly 
crucial circumstances.15 The CNH worked heavily with the press to get favorable stories 
published, and hired a public relations firm to cover press activities, although after unsatisfactory 
results the CNH shifted to using paid staff and focused on using the specialized press, which was 
generally more favorable. They also distributed literature directly, printing thousands of 
pamphlets and propaganda pieces annually.16 The CNH’s most heavy coordination was with 
organized labor, which provided the largest base of organizations fully committed to national 
health insurance.  
The legislation the CNH supported was quite similar to the proposals of the National 
Health Conference of 1938, and to the Wagner bill of 1939. The CNH backed national health 
insurance, as proposed by President Truman and as detailed in the Wagner-Murray-Dingell 
legislation. This legislation had components other than national health insurance. The bill also 
included additional federal funding for states’ public health programs, funding for medical 
education and research, funding for “community-wide maternal and child health services,” and 
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additional aid to help poor people access care.17 The CNH backed all of these provisions but 
focused most heavily on national health insurance.  
 The Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill of 1945 had several critical components of its insurance 
plan. Similar to the 1939 bill, it kept the institution of private practice, and, unlike the British 
plan, did not create government run medical establishments. Rather, the system of private 
hospitals and facilities was maintained, with the difference being that the vast majority of 
individuals would now be insured by the government. The major distinction between the 1939 
bill and the 1945 bill was that the latter set up a truly national insurance system, based on Social 
Security. The plan was nearly universal, and included groups not covered under Social Security, 
such as farmers, domestic workers, and the self-employed.18 The major groups of excluded 
workers were ministers and government workers.19 Senator Wagner estimated that about 110 
million people would be covered, out of a population of around 140 million.20  Like Social 
Security, the plan maintained a strong relationship with employment, and the plan was to be 
financed via a payroll tax.21 Unemployed individuals would not be automatically covered, 
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although local governments could decide to include welfare recipients.22 This was not a fully 
universal health insurance scheme, but it was a significant step in that direction.   
The arguments and rhetoric used by the CNH and by Wagner followed a fairly set 
pattern, one similar to the arguments made during the Roosevelt era. National health insurance 
proponents argued that too many people lacked access to adequate medical care. Although 
voluntary insurance was growing, it was thought insufficient to ever cover a substantial enough 
percentage of the population. There was thus a need for the government to step in, applying the 
insurance principle to as broad a population as possible.23 Proponents were careful to rebut 
certain phrasings they were concerned would weaken support. In particular, the term “socialized 
medicine” was heavily disavowed. Both Wagner and the CNH rebuked the term and denied that 
the proposal qualified.24 Their argument was that “socialized medicine” refers to “medical care 
furnished by Government doctors free of charge,” and that the Wagner-Murray-Dingell 
legislation did not use government physicians.25 Additionally, proponents refuted certain false 
accusations against the bill, noting that patients would maintain their choice of doctor, a fact 
frequently pointed to by proponents.26  
The Donors Versus Organized Labor  
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 In 1946, the CNH’s budget was $50,000 for the nine months it was active.27 The 
substantial funding for the CNH initially came from a handful of sources,28 particularly the 
Lasker and Rosenwald families. In 1949, for example, the Laskers and Rosenwalds gave the 
CNH $50,000 for the first half of the year, more than half the annual budget.29 This led them to 
have significant influence over the CNH, with Albert Lasker having a seat on the Board of 
Directors.30 A life-long Republican, Albert Lasker, who earned tens millions of dollars in the 
advertising industry, became liberal towards the end of his life, voting for Roosevelt in 1944 and 
for Truman in 1948.31 His wife, Mary Lasker, herself active in the debates regarding the CNH, 
would continue as a medical philanthropist for decades after Albert Laskers’ death in 1952.32 
Lessing Rosenwald, the chief interlocutor from the Rosenwald family, inherited his fortune from 
Julius Rosenwald, who had become affluent through Sears.33 Anna Rosenberg, a member of the 
Board of Directors and a public relations executive who had been close with FDR, was allied 
with the Laskers and Rosenwalds.34 
 It is not entirely clear why conflict emerged in the CNH between the Rosenwalds, 
Laskers, Rosenberg, and the rest of the organization, including organized labor, Frothingham, 
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and Davis. This senior project examines only the documents in the Committee for the Nation’s 
Health’s archive, compiled by Michael Davis. There are more documents containing 
correspondence from Davis’ side, and it is not as clear what the Rosenwalds, Laskers, and 
Rosenberg were saying in their internal conversations. Thus, the conclusions have to be tentative 
given the partial nature of the available material.  
As early as 1947, executive director Joseph Loucheim called for adding additional 
sources of revenue, decreasing the CNH’s “dependence on a small number of large givers.”35 
The CNH failed in broadening its donor base, however. Its expenditures dropped to just $33,000 
in 1947, following the $50,000 budget for 1946.36 Organized labor was not yet a significant 
financial backer of the CNH, although labor was able to voice its concerns through John 
Edelman, President of the Textile Workers Union (CIO), and Nelson Cruikshank, a high-ranking 
AFL staff member. Open conflict only broke out the following year. An immediate cause of the 
clash was the failure of the CNH to pass national health insurance legislation in the first half of 
1948. The donors expected such legislation to pass, although given the Republican control of 
Congress this does not seem to have been a reasonable expectation. Later in the year, Rosenwald 
confronted Davis over the failure, saying that he had “promised passage of a health insurance bill 
in 1948,” a charge Davis denied.37 Davis suggested that it was the Laskers who had promised the 
Rosenwalds passage of legislation.38 Regardless of what Davis may or may not have suggested 
to the donors about the likelihood of quick success, the lack of demonstrable progress left the 
donors feeling the need to change the direction of the organization.  
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The proposal to revamp the CNH was an unsubtle attack on Davis’ authority. Davis was 
not only the chairman of the executive committee of the Committee for the Nation’s Health, but 
also held a leadership position with the Committee on Research in Medical Economics (CRME), 
which had existed prior to the CNH and provided research services for it. The CNH shared office 
space originally with the CRME, but they soon split off, as the CRME needed to protect its tax-
exempt status.39 In the second half of 1948, the Rosenwalds and Laskers called for splitting off 
more fully research (CRME) and political activities (CNH). This meant that one individual, 
Davis, could not be in charge of both organizations. The Rosenwalds and Laskers instead wanted 
Davis to serve merely as a “consultant” to the political arm.40 They threatened to cut off all 
funding to the political arm if Davis did not abdicate his position in the CNH.  
Davis was happy to give up some of his authority in the Committee for the Nation’s 
Health. He was at the time fulfilling many administrative tasks he found undesirable.41 He even 
offered, in a letter to his ally, Channing Frothingham, to step down as chairman of the Executive 
Committee, or to leave the CNH entirely “if in the opinion of yourself [Frothingham] and other 
friends, it is best for the cause.”42 But the downgrading of his role in the CNH to merely a 
“consultant” was too much an indignity for him to accept. He argued to Frothingham that serving 
as a consultant “would not yield satisfactory results, for so-called technical considerations are 
inseparable from objectives and policies.”43 There is some validity to Davis’ claim regarding 
consultant work, but a more likely explanation is that Davis would rather have left the 
organization entirely then be so thoroughly downgraded in rank and prestige.  
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This specific focus on limiting Davis’ role suggests that there was some personal tension 
between him and the donors. The Rosenwalds had long funded his CRME, so they were at least 
somewhat comfortable with his leadership in the research realm.44 The donors’ proposal was to 
have him continue leading CRME, so it likely that they were unhappy with his leadership of the 
CNH rather than being fully against Davis.  
The exact direction the donors wanted to take the CNH is not clear from the documents, 
partially due to the limitations discussed earlier. In an Executive Committee meeting from 
November of 1938, Davis suggested that the donors wanted increased support from major 
corporations.45 Davis reports that “Mr. Lasker’s fixed policy of one-year commitments means 
they want to make annual decisions, want a PR program for mass media, a new CNH free from 
New Deal stigma, and a legislative program acceptable to big business.”46  
It is worth explaining each of these policy suggestions, with the caveat that this was 
Davis’ summary of what Lasker had said, rather than a quote from Lasker directly. Given the 
presence of labor representatives in the room, the mention of “big business” may have been an 
effort by Davis to get additional support against Lasker’s program. The mention of a “PR 
program for mass media” may seem like a fairly innocuous idea, but this was the subject of 
consistent debate within the CNH. The problem was that mass media buys were far more 
expensive than working through more specialized press, such as the labor, the black press,  and 
the women’s press. The Committee for the Nation’s Health had hired a public relations firm in 
1948 to conduct a general press campaign. This effort was thought to have been unsuccessful, 
and their contract was not renewed. In April of 1948, the Executive Committee decided to focus 
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on the specialized press while continuing outreach to the general press.47 It was Davis 
specifically who had made the case for doing so to Lessing Rosenwald, Albert Lasker, and Anna 
Rosenberg in June 1948.48  Davis’ reasoning was that a general press approach would only be 
successful with more resources, and that an insufficient effort at the general press would leave 
the CNH open to counter-attacks. The suggestion to return to a general press strategy was thus a 
rebuke of not only existing CNH policy but specifically of Davis, although it was also a return to 
Lasker’s professional specialty as an advertising executive.  
The desire for a CNH “free of New Deal stigma” and for a “legislative program 
acceptable to big business” went together logically. Davis had stated in 1947 that part of the 
problem the CNH was having in the general press was because of the association between 
national health insurance and the New Deal.49 Eliminating that stigma through a shift of program 
towards one friendlier to big business would thus likely lead to more favorable media coverage. 
As discussed, big business support for the CNH was lacking, besides nominal support from a few 
key figures. Davis’ summary of Lasker’s comments does not tell us what changes in policy he 
had in mind in order to gain additional support from the affluent. Thankfully, Monte Poen’s 
Harry Truman Versus the Medical Lobby provides additional insight through an interview Poen 
conducted with Mary Lasker in 1967. Lasker said that Davis was too ambitious in his policy 
goals, and that she and the Rosenwalds wanted to redirect the focus of the CNH from national 
health insurance to other, more achievable health related items.50 Doing so would have 
fundamentally changed the nature of the CNH.  
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The donors’ turn away from pushing national health insurance should not be understood 
as a disagreement with that aim. Albert Lasker had testified to Congress in 1947 in favor of 
national health insurance, and we have little reason to doubt the sincerity of those beliefs. Rather, 
conflict broke out due to a difference in priority. The Laskers and Rosenwalds were willing to 
donate large amounts of money to support a national health insurance campaign, but this was far 
from their only interest and they were not willing to give tens of thousands of dollars year after 
year to support it. The CNH as an advocate for national health insurance would demand more 
from them than they were willing to give, and the uncertainty over national health insurance’s 
passage led them to call for a change of direction in the CNH.  
A committee led by Frothingham, Cruikshank, Edelman, and Morris Cooke, an engineer, 
were able to negotiate with the donors for additional contributions for the year 1949. They were 
aided by Harry Truman’s surprise victory in the presidential election, which raised hopes that 
national health insurance had a realistic chance of passing in the next Congress.  
A nearly identical fight emerged in the fall of 1949, with the battle lines similar to the 
previous year’s. This time, however, there was increased animosity towards the donors. In a 
letter to Davis from November 1949, Cooke wrote that “it ought not to be too difficult to get it 
over to Mr. Money Bags [presumably Albert Lasker] that if he wants to be the whole works, he 
had better get up a new organization.”51 Although no one else used language quite as colorful, 
others had similar sentiments. Particularly noteworthy is the stance taken by organized labor. 
Poen argues that labor’s support for Davis became clear in January 1950, which precipitated 
Rosenwald leaving the CNH.52 In fact, organized labor had been on Davis’ side earlier. 
Cruikshank, the AFL representative, stated in a letter from November of 1949 to Frothingham 
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that “we have not yet found the way to prevent a concentration of control arising from the 
concentration of financial support,” a clear rebuke of the donors’ effort to control the 
organization.53 The AFL thus did not wait until January to support Davis, as Poen alleges.  
The position of Edelman, is less clear in the 1949 fight, and perhaps there was a decisive 
shift in January of 1950. During 1948, however, Edelman was clearly on Davis’ side. After the 
election of that year, Edelman argued in an Executive Committee meeting that it was not time to 
compromise but to pursue fully the legislation the CNH desired.54 Cruikshank and Edelman both 
argued “that Dr. Davis’ continued presence on the Executive Committee and his active 
participation in shaping legislative policy and action would be necessary for CNH’s future 
soundness”, rebuking the donors’ suggestion that Davis become a consultant.55 There is less 
evidence regarding Edelman’s role in 1949, but the 1948 documents show that Edelman was 
inclined to back Davis against the influence of the donors.  
The Rosenwalds, Laskers, and Anna Rosenberg were isolated within the CNH. If for 
them national health insurance was just one component of several changes to the health system 
they would like to have seen, to Davis and other members of the CNH, national health insurance 
was the crucial component of any health care reform. This was particularly the case for 
organized labor, which while not opposed to expanding government support for research or 
medical education, understood that it was health insurance which most directly impacted their 
membership. In his November 21, 1949 letter to Frothingham, Cruikshank noted the rising 
support for national health insurance in the AFL, and that the head of Labor’s League for 
Political Education (the political arm of the AFL) wanted to “make national health insurance one 
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of the major objectives of the political campaign of 1950.”56 In such a context, organized labor 
was not going to allow the CNH to be anything other than a conduit for the campaign for 
national health insurance. Hence, the proposal by the Rosenwalds and Laskers were simply 
unacceptable to the unions.  
After another year of inadequate progress in 1949, the Rosenwald and Lasker families 
ceased donations to the CNH.57 The immediate reason was Rosenwald’s discovery of the letter 
from Cruikshank quoted above.58 With the withdrawal of support from the Rosenwalds and 
Laskers, the Committee for the Nation’s Health was on the verge of collapse. At several points, it 
had funds on hand for just a few weeks.59 The only reason the CNH was able to continue 
operating was the financial support given by labor unions. Unions had not previously been major 
donors to the CNH, hence the financial domination of the group by a few individuals. In 1950, 
facing the CNH’s collapse, organized labor came to the CNH’s aid in an unprecedented manner. 
The largest donation from a union was from the Lady Garment Workers, who gave $3500, 
followed by $2000 donations by the Autoworkers and Steelworkers, and $1000 from the 
Machinists.60 Among the federations, the AFL gave $5000 and the CIO gave $500 for 1950, 
although the CIO also made an additional $5000 donation earmarked for 1951. The subsequent 
year, the Steelworkers gave $5000, which was matched by the Autoworkers.61 These figures do 
not contain the full lengths of labor’s support, since it does not include smaller donations, 
including from union locals. In total, 80% of funds given in 1950 came from organized labor.62 
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This reliance on unions continued until the CNH closed, itself a reaction to the merger of the 
AFL and CIO, which eliminated the need for a separate organization to coordinate their health 
efforts.  
Prior to the merger, labor unions had undergone major changes with regards to their 
relationship to healthcare in the years following World War 2, which impacted their actions 
relating to national health insurance proposals. Several unions, including the Steelworkers, the 
Autoworkers, and the Mineworkers, negotiated private health insurance plans in the years after 
World War 2.63 This was aided by a 1949 NLRB ruling requiring employers to negotiate over 
health and other fringe benefits.64 Unions spent a considerable amount of their energy and 
resources securing private insurance, with 55% of strikes in 1949 and 70% of strikes in the 
beginning of 1950 called for health related issues.65 With the exception of the Mineworkers, 
those unions which won benefits did not end entirely their support for government health 
insurance, but it has been argued that the issue lost its high level of salience. 66 
Not all unions were able to win health insurance for their members. AFL unions in 
particular found it more difficult to negotiate for health insurance, due to the local and more 
competitive nature of the industries with high AFL membership.67 Whereas 95% percent of CIO 
members had privately negotiated health insurance in 1950, only 20% percent of AFL members 
did.68 Other scholars have argued that this led to a reversal of the traditional pattern of the CIO 
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more strongly supporting social democratic programs, with the AFL now more concerned about 
passing a universal health insurance program than the CIO.69 
The list of donors is at least somewhat contrary to the arguments made regarding the 
decreased support for national health insurance in the CIO due to the CIO’s better success in 
negotiating private plans. With the exception of the donation from the ILGWU, an AFL affiliate, 
the major union donations were from CIO unions. The large donations from the Steelworkers 
and Autoworkers is particularly noteworthy, as these unions had by this point already negotiated 
private health plans.70 To be clear, these unions also happened to be some of the wealthiest, so it 
would not be surprising that they would top the donations list of an organization financially 
supported by unions. Additionally, as a federation the AFL had more money than the CIO due to 
its larger size, perhaps explaining the more sizeable 1950 contribution. The financial figures also 
do not show the extent of the coordination with the CNH and the grassroots effort the unions put 
in to fighting for national health insurance. Nonetheless, this singular data point does suggest that 
the argument regarding the AFL unions’ greater eagerness to put resources into the national 
health insurance fight is overstated, as unions of both federations provided similar amounts of 
money to the CNH. 
 Why did the CNH fail?  
Michael Davis had a single explanation for the failure to pass national health insurance 
while the CNH was active: the split between Northern and Southern Democrats. On multiple 
occasions, Davis argued that the division between Truman and Southern elected officials, 
brought on by Truman’s advocacy for civil rights, made Southern Democrats unwilling to 
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support Truman’s health care agenda.71 Given that Northern Democrats on their own lacked the 
votes to pass national health insurance, and the opposition in the Republican Party, this made the 
legislation politically untenable.  
We should take Davis’ position seriously. It is reflected in the vote to make a cabinet 
position for health related activities, seen as a proxy for a national health insurance vote.72 
Southern Democrats voted overwhelmingly against adding the cabinet position. It also makes 
sense in the historical context of the Democratic Party.  President Franklin Roosevelt’s New 
Deal incorporated black voters in the north, and took a more liberal attitude towards blacks than 
previous Democratic presidents. Adding black voters to the Democratic coalition, even if they 
were Northerners, worried white Southerners that this would disrupt Northern Democrats’ 
acceptance of Southern racial practices.73 Nonetheless, white Southerners continued to support 
the Democratic Party, and the New Deal, with Southern Congressmen only voting against 
Northern Democrats on race-related issues.74  
Starting arguably in the late 30’s, and definitely by World War 2, Southern Democrats 
began to move to the right politically, although this may have been limited solely to labor related 
issues.75 The Southern Democrats’ less friendly attitude to organized labor during and after the 
war was a response to the spread of unions, some of which were integrated, to the South, a 
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development which fundamentally threatened the Southern racial order.76 This led to a shift in 
Southern Democrats’ voting behavior away from support for labor, leading to the 1947 Taft-
Hartley Act, passed with support from Republicans and a majority of Southern Democrats, with 
opposition from Northern Democrats and a border state Democratic President.77  
Davis suggested that the Southern antipathy to national health insurance legislation was 
because of their ongoing fight with Truman over civil rights. This may be true, but it also ignores 
the racial implications of the Wagner-Murray-Dingell legislation, which would have rapidly 
expanded health access for Southern blacks, challenging Jim Crow. Each year’s version of the 
Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill had different components, with the 1943 and 1945 pieces of 
legislation having significantly lower levels of local control than the earlier Wagner bill and the 
later 1947 and 1948 bills.78 The conflict between Truman and Southern Democrats may have 
made the racial implications of the health bill more salient, but in the absence of the feud the 
racial interests of Southern Democrats still would have led them to either oppose the legislation 
or seek modifications consistent with Jim Crow, as happened with Social Security.79 The major 
health legislation which did pass in this era, the 1946 Hill-Burton Act, which funded hospital 
construction, allowed for the funding of segregated facilities, much to the ire of civil rights 
activists.80 Southern Democrats were willing to support health legislation, but only if left Jim 
Crow entirely unchallenged.   
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One of the few Southern Democrats to support national health insurance was Senator 
Claude Pepper of Florida. Pepper was by no means a racial liberal, having previously supported 
the filibuster of anti-lynching legislation sponsored by Robert Wagner.81 Yet compared to many 
other Southern Democrats, Pepper’s views on race were moderate.82 On non-racial matters, 
Pepper was far to the left, particularly on foreign policy, where he defended Britain’s labor 
government as “socialist” and opposing the Cold War on pro-Soviet grounds.83 His opponent in 
the 1950 Senate primary used Pepper’s alleged closeness to blacks successfully defeat him.84 
Florida’s racial politics had complexities not present in other Southern states, given the 
substantial number of liberals from New York in the southern tip of the state.85 The case of 
Pepper demonstrates that although it was possible for a Southern Democrat to back Wagner-
Murray-Dingell, such support was unlikely. A Democrat with a strong commitment to the New 
Deal and a lower level of commitment to upholding Jim Crow, like Pepper may have been 
willing to back national health insurance, but there were few Southern Democratic members of 
Congress with views similar to him. Hence, the near absence of Southern support for national 
health insurance.  
Michael Davis’ explanation for the failure of national health insurance is thus pertinent, 
but it also conveniently ignores the role of the CNH as a social movement organization. After all, 
there is little the CNH could have done even hypothetically to minimize the impact of the north-
south split, minus compromising the inclusive nature of the legislation. The CNH was heavily 
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involved in other facets of the campaign for national health insurance, however, as the leading 
organization of its type, and it therefore makes sense to examine the operations of the CNH in 
determining why its goals were not achieved.  
The most intuitive explanation is that the CNH lacked the funding of the AMA. The 
AMA was spending ten times the amount of the CNH, if not more, and these added resources 
made the efforts of the CNH significantly more difficult. As members of the CNH alluded to, 
running an underfunded national media campaign can actually hurt the cause, leaving the 
organization open to counterattacks.86 The CNH’s inability to compete with the AMA financially 
most surely contributed to the drop in popular support for national health insurance from 1946 to 
1949, and thus made national health insurance less likely to pass. The financial disadvantage 
possessed by the CNH was the result of several factors. First, doctors tended to have high 
incomes, and their opposition to national health insurance led to the AMA having a base of 
wealthy contributors. The structure of the AMA also mattered though. Through its power over 
licensing, the AMA had the ability to censure doctors who were not members of the 
organization, so that “defiance of AMA authority means professional suicide for the majority [of 
physicians].87 Thus, even doctors who were not particularly supportive of the AMA’s political 
agenda had no choice but to pay the yearly assessments.  
 By contrast, the CNH had no comparable way of securing a stream of donations from 
those doctors who were in support of national health insurance. Additional revenue need not 
have come from physicians. Had the CNH had greater support from wealthy donors, it also 
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would have been able to compete with the AMA more readily. This support was not 
forthcoming, however, even from sympathetic figures like Gerald Swope.  
The lack of substantial support from the wealthy, with the exception of the major donors 
already discussed, is a consequence of the balance of powers in the health care debate. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, industrialists in other countries have on occasion endorsed expanded 
health insurance. The key is that there needs to be a greater threat that would compel them to 
compromise. In the case of Social Security, the Townsend movement created pressure from 
below for an unreasonable program which needed to be avoided.88 In the case of Bismarck’s 
health program, the goal was to stave off the threat of socialism.89 This elite support for national 
health insurance therefore is a defensive responsive and an attempt to compromise and weaken 
the strength of radicals. The Committee for the Nation’s Health represented the left-flank of the 
movement for expanded health insurance. Backed by organized labor, there was no more 
invasive threat to capitalists via health insurance than the CNH’s proposals, particularly in the 
era of McCarthyism. In such a context, it would have made little sense for capitalists to support 
the CNH plan en masse. Alternatively, they would have been expected to support expanded 
access to health insurance via alternative means, especially those that would allow for large 
profits. This is what happened.  
Forces across the political spectrum supported proposals which would have been 
anathema in the 1930’s, such as Senator Taft’s plan to provide health insurance to poor people. 
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The wealthy capitalist Bernard Baruch proposed a system of national health insurance for people 
below a certain income, with the affluent using private insurance. A proposal by two 
Republicans in Congress, Jacob Javits and Richard Nixon, called for a “locally controlled, 
government subsidized, private nonprofit insurance system, with premiums scaled to subscribers’ 
incomes”.90 Business supported these more moderate proposals, rather than the large expansion 
of the welfare state that would have accompanied the Wagner-Murray-Dingell legislation.91 It is 
for these reasons that the CNH, short of compromising itself as Lasker proposed, was unable to 
accrue significant support from big business.  
Without healthy support from physicians or big business, the CNH was necessarily going 
to be heavily out-funded by the AMA. Had organized labor provided substantial contributions 
prior to 1950, the gap would have been smaller, since as it happened there was no point where 
the Laskers, Rosenwalds, and unions were making large contributions simultaneously. 
Nonetheless, even added financial support from the unions would not have done much to close 
the funding gap.  
The AMA’s advantage was not just material. The prestige given to doctors gave the 
AMA legitimacy in discussing health issues. The AMA had doctors put messages from the AMA 
in their offices, providing the AMA’s positions with the authority of the doctor’s office.92 Starr 
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adds that the social capital of doctors, including their connections to other wealthy individuals, 
aided the AMA campaign.93 
Differences in the mobilization of financial resources clearly mattered, but there are other 
resources social movement organizations can use. In particular, some scholars have criticized the 
CNH and its labor partners for using an elite strategy rather than one of mass mobilization, 
which Derickson calls “a crucial flaw in the campaign for health security.”94 There is no 
documentary evidence in the CNH’s archives that they held a single rally or protest in favor of 
national health insurance. This was a result of the advocacy model deployed by the CNH, which 
relied on using elite backroom deals, in distinction to a mobilizing or organizing approach.95 
Labor’s hesitance to engage its membership is particularly noteworthy given the otherwise high 
level of membership involvement in union activities at this time.96 However, the importance of 
the lack of membership mobilization is questionable. Would a mobilized membership been able 
to convince the same Republicans and Southern Democrats who in 1947 voted for the anti-union 
Taft-Hartley Act? This is unlikely. Unions, of course, were not powerful enough to stop Taft-
Hartley, or to repeal it, despite their mobilization of membership and heavy involvement in 
Congressional elections. Even if unions had been able to use this level of resources on the nearly 
simultaneous fight on health insurance, the case of Taft-Hartley demonstrates that national health 
insurance still likely would have failed. The lack of grassroots mobilization cannot explain the 
failure of the CNH. This is not to say that the emergence of a massive movement for national 
health insurance would not have shifted the political balance on the question, but rather that the 
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level of mobilization which realistically could have been achieved by the CNH and the unions 
would have been insufficient without changes in the parameters of the health insurance fight.  
This leads us to return to the question of labor union strength. The late 1940’s were in 
many ways the heyday of the labor movement, and is when union density reached its apex. This 
peak was higher than the density achieved by Canadian unions when Canada enacted its single 
payer legislation in the 1960’s.97 We should not overestimate the strength of unions in this 
period, as it was at this moment that the anti-union Taft-Hartley legislation was passed. 
Nonetheless, the weak labor union hypothesis is less applicable in the late 1940’s than at any 
other time in US history, due to the economic and political power unions possessed. Given that 
other countries have enacted national health insurance with a labor movement as powerful as the 
American labor movement of the late 1940’s, union weakness cannot be the main factor 
contributing to the failure of national health insurance in the CNH era. This is not to ignore that 
when compared internationally, the US labor movement was still relatively weak, and lacked a 
true labor party to ally with. Nonetheless, the unions were strong enough that, if there had been 
enough other favorable conditions, national health insurance could plausibly have been enacted.   
 Contingent events shaped the direction of the push for national health insurance under 
Truman. First of these was the 1945-1946 strike wave launched after the end of the war, the 
largest in US history, which resulted in a decrease in popular support for unions, as they were 
seen as being disruptive and pushing too far.98 This weakened unions’ political legitimacy, and 
led the way for the Republican takeover of Congress in the 1946 mid-term elections, after which 
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national health insurance was foreclosed for two years. By the time Democrats regained power 
after the 1948 election, rising McCarthyism made policies that could be associated with the 
Soviet Union anathema. Opponents of national health insurance were aware of this, spreading a 
fabricated quote from Vladimir Lenin about the importance of government health care to 
socialism.99 These contingencies created an environment less friendly to national health 
insurance than would otherwise have been the case.  
 Conclusion 
   The late 40’s were the only era in US history when a sitting president had unequivocally 
stated his public support for national health insurance. Yet despite the potentially favorable 
conditions, national health insurance legislation failed to make substantial progress under 
Truman. This chapter has examined that failure through the lens of the major advocacy 
organization, the Committee for the Nation’s Health. Outfunded by its chief rival, the AMA, the 
CNH failed to increase public support for the legislation. Yet it was not only a question of 
resources which led to the defeat of national health insurance legislation. The divide between 
Northern and Southern Democrats, which had been festering for at least a decade, prevented 
supporters from gaining majority support in Congress. The CNH’s initial failures led to a split 
within the organization, causing the CNH to serve as merely an appendage of a labor movement 
not able to commit the resources necessary to single-handedly pass the legislation. The 
Committee for the Nation’s Health continued on for several years after the decisive defeat in the 
1950 midterms, but the opportunity had already been missed.  
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Conclusion 
This Senior Project has examined conflict over health insurance policy during a crucial 
two-decade period, from the beginning of the New Deal to the end of Truman’s presidency. The 
defeat of universal health insurance during this period shaped the subsequent history of health 
care provision, as the gains made in private health insurance limited the potential for single-
payer insurance as well as for a national health system.   
Empirically, the best explanation as to why universal health insurance efforts failed in the 
1930s and 40s is the lobbying power of the American Medical Association. Not only did the 
AMA possess ample economic resources, but it fully prioritized medical issues as the 
representative of America’s doctors. Labor unions, the most organized and well-funded 
supporters of universal health insurance, did not prioritize health policy in this way. Big business 
was for the most part absent from the debates of the time. The AMA was able to not only 
overcome public opinion, which was originally in support of adding a health insurance 
component to the Social Security Act, but to change it. Support for universal health insurance 
plans dropped precipitously in the late 1940’s as the AMA was conducting a major public 
relations campaign. The AMA was aided by the divide between Northern and Southern 
Democrats, which was present in the Roosevelt era, and became a crucial impediment to national 
health insurance during Truman’s presidency. Compared to other high-income countries, 
physicians in the United States have a high level of professional unity and a greater tradition of 
autonomy from the state, which have both aided the AMA.1 
Interest groups continue to play a major role in the formation of health policy, even as the 
specific groups themselves have changed in importance.  Business groups have gained influence 
                                                                
1 David Wilsford, Doctors and the State: The Politics of Health Care in France and the United States, 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991), 274.  
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on health policy since the end of the 1940’s, and the American Association for Retired People, 
founded in 1958, is now one of the most influential lobbying groups. Meanwhile, labor unions 
and the AMA have seen their strength reduced.  
The two most recent major health insurance policy initiatives suggest that interest group 
positions continue to be the key factor determining health policy outcomes. President Trump’s 
on-going efforts to repeal the Affordable Care Act is an illustration of this. The Trump/Ryan plan 
failed to gain the support of any of the major interest groups. Not only were labor unions 
opposed, as expected, but the AMA, AHA, ANA, and newer groups, including the AARP, and 
the conglomeration of health insurance companies were on record against Trump’s proposed 
legislation.2 It should be of little surprise then that the effort has failed to date, although the bill’s 
seemingly rushed and ill-thought out nature could not have helped matters. The failure of the 
Trump plan, along with the 1993 Clinton plan, makes the success of the Affordable Care Act 
even more noteworthy. Like the creation of Medicare, the ACA is not a fully universal plan, and 
Supreme Court rulings have given significantly more leeway to state governments than was 
originally intended. The ACA is just seven years old, and the fully story of its creation has yet to 
be told. Future researchers will no doubt look at the ACA as an illustration of what factors need 
to be present for major health insurance reform to succeed in Congress. One easily observable 
                                                                
2 Eli Watkins. “Groups Lining Up in Opposition to Health Care Plan.” CNN, 2017. 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/08/politics/interest-groups-politicians-american-health-care-act/. 
Abby Goodnough, Robert Pear, and Thomas Kaplan. “Health Groups Unite to Oppose Republican Bill.” 
New York Times, March 9, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/us/politics/affordable-care-act-
obama-care-health.html?_r=0. 
AFL-CIO Staff. “9 Ways the Republican Health Care Bill Makes Health Coverage in America 
Unaffordable and Out of Reach.” AFL-CIO, 2017. https://aflcio.org/2017/3/15/9-ways-republican-health-
care-bill-makes-health-coverage-america-unaffordable-and-out. 
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metric is the support for interest groups garnered by the ACA; labor unions, the AMA, and 
insurance companies supported the legislation.3 
The actual content of health insurance debates has remained remarkably similar 
throughout the intervening time between the Truman period and today. The fears of 
conservatives of a tyrannical government taking away one’s choice of doctor remains a trope 
used in contemporary debates, as is the call by some liberals that only government action can 
solve the nation’s insurance woes. The role played by state governments continues to be an 
unsolved issue. States’ rights concerns were a major concern during the Roosevelt and Truman 
eras, as particularly mediated through the racism of Jim Crow states. These debates reverberate 
in the contemporary period. A section of the Affordable Care Act was ruled unconstitutional by 
the Supreme Court for unjustly coercing states to expand Medicaid. Many states, and all 
Southern states except Arkansas have subsequently decided not to expand it, thus weakening the 
national character of the ACA.4 This interplay between state governments and the federal 
government is one which has consistently dogged the formation of any national health policy. 
The Supreme Court’s ruling on Medicaid expansion is unlikely to be the last word on the matter.  
What has changed most dramatically since the period examined in this senior project is 
the scope of liberals’ proposals. Although the Affordable Care Act rapidly expanded coverage, it 
did so in such a way that would have had made conservatives of the 1940’s proud, through its 
continued reliance on for-profit insurers. The Javits-Nixon plan, by contrast, would have 
                                                                
3 Jill Quadagno, “Interest-Group Influence on the Patient Protection and Affordability Act of 2010: 
Winners and Losers in the Health Care Reform Debate,” Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and Law 36, 
no. 3 (2011): 449-453.  
Jonathan Oberlander, “Long Time Coming: Why Health Reform Finally Passed,” Health Affairs 29, no. 6 
(2010): 1112-1116.  
4 Jessica C. Barnett, and Marina S. Vornovitsky. “Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2015.” 
Washington D.C., 2016, 19.  
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provided near-universal coverage through non-profit insurers, and is arguable to the political left 
of the ACA. Prior to Bernie Sanders’ 2016 presidential campaign, single-payer insurance, the 
policy goal of Harry Trumann, had been off the table for decades.  
Future research will incorporate the insights that can be gained from the recent successful 
and unsuccessful efforts to reform the health insurance system. It will also need to examine state-
level health insurance policy debates as a way of confirming the conclusions reached here, with 
attention to the differences of state-level policy formation. States provide fifty different case 
studies to be examined, which allows for more specific understandings of the interaction between 
different variables.  Most studies of health insurance policy have focused on the national level, 
even though the federal system allows states great, although not unlimited, leeway in choosing 
health insurance policies.  
The last major theme that needs to be examined is the question of convergence between 
health insurance systems. As neo-liberal policies are implemented throughout Europe, and with 
the recent expansion of public health insurance through the Affordable Care Act, the differences 
between the US model and other countries may be reducing. If true, this convergence would 
have major implications for how we are to understand the historically exceptional nature of the 
US health insurance system. It would suggest that health insurance in the United States has had a 
unique trajectory not because of the country’s intrinsic nature, but because of specific historical 
circumstances which are no longer operative.  
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